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In 1991, protesters in Dili, East Timor were massacred 
by Indonesian troops. This turned out to be a political 
disaster for the Indonesian government, greatly 
increasing international support for the East Timorese 
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I started studying and promoting nonviolent action in the late 
1970s. My special interest was designing society so that nonvio-
lent methods could make militaries unnecessary.
One of the intriguing features of nonviolent action is that 
when peaceful protesters are brutally attacked, this can lead to 
greater support for the protesters. The pioneering nonviolence 
researcher Gene Sharp called this “political jiu-jitsu.”1 In the 
sport of jiu-jitsu, the opponent’s force and momentum can be 
turned against them. Likewise, protesters, by remaining non-
violent, can turn the attacker’s overwhelming force against the 
attacker, generating greater support. 
There are innumerable cases of resistance to injustice. In 
about 2000, I became interested in situations in which there 
wasn’t much resistance. Two colleagues — Wendy Varney and 
Adrian Vickers — and I looked at human rights abuses by In-
donesian military forces. In some cases, such as the invasion of 
East Timor, there was plenty of resistance. But in others, there 
was surprisingly little. In 1965, Indonesian military forces be-
gan a massive killing campaign targeted at communists, a cam-
paign considered by many scholars to be genocide. There were 
perhaps 800,000 victims. There was relatively little resistance 
within Indonesia and, even more surprisingly, little outrage 
outside the country. This was a bloodbath welcomed by many 
anti-communist governments.2
1  Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).
2  Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian Vickers, “Political Jiu-Jitsu against In-
donesian Repression: Studying Lower-profile Nonviolent Resistance,” Pacifica Review, 
Author’s note
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I knew about political jiu-jitsu. The victims of the 1965–1966 
killings did not resist with any violence. This made me think 
about why, in some cases, political jiu-jitsu did not happen. I 
had the idea that the attackers might be doing something to 
dampen the jiu-jitsu effect. Gradually I developed ideas about 
methods used by perpetrators to minimise outrage. Because the 
framework I developed has significant features not included in 
Sharp’s political jiu-jitsu, I called the effect “backfire.” 
In the past decade I’ve applied the backfire model to a wide 
range of cases. It applies readily to massacres of peaceful pro-
testers, for example in East Timor and South Africa. It can also 
be applied to injustices outside the normal nonviolent-action 
framework, for example to censorship, sexual harassment, po-
lice beatings, torture and genocide.3
This manual is designed to provide practical guidance on 
using the backfire model. It is for those who are taking action 
against injustice and who want to think carefully about the most 
effective steps to take.
The backfire model is simply a guide to thinking strategically 
and tactically. It is not a substitute for thinking. Anyone who 
is going to be effective needs local knowledge and practical in-
sight. There is no formula for success that will work everywhere 
on all occasions. The most a model can do is provide reminders 
about things to take into account.
The most important message from the model is to think 
about options and to take into account what the other side is 
likely to do. This is obvious enough when stated this way, but 
in practice activists often do the things they’ve always done and 
think mainly about what they want to achieve and what they 
plan to do, not what opponents will do.
Chapter 1 introduces the backfire model. Chapter 2 describes 
backfire analysis: how to discover and understand the tactics 
Vol. 13, 2001, pp. 143–156.
3  For numerous articles, see “Backfire materials,” http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/back-
fire.html
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used by perpetrators of injustice that inhibit outrage. Chapter 3 
gives suggestions on preparing for action, taking into account 
what opponents could do. Chapter 4 gives ideas about taking 
action while an injustice is occurring, and after the key events 
are over. Chapter 5 gives responses to some questions about the 
model.
I have used a few examples, such as police beatings, as exam-
ples. You should think of your own examples, preferably issues 
that you know a lot about, and analyse them. The backfire mod-
el is only a set of tools for thinking, not a recipe for action. You 
need to practise thinking strategically. So think up your own 
examples. What would you do if a nuclear weapon exploded in 
a nearby city? What would you do if you discovered a massive 
government fraud? Chapter 6 has some exercises. You can also 
develop your own. 
There’s lots of research on expert performance showing that 
to become good at something, you need to spend a lot of time 
practising the most difficult parts of the task.4 If you want to be-
come good at being an effective activist, you need to spend a lot 
of time thinking tactically and strategically. The backfire model 
can be a tool for helping do that.
On my website, I’ve included lots of articles that use the mod-
el. Please send me copies or links so that the information base 
about the model can be expanded.5 I’m especially interested in 
learning about weaknesses in the model and in ways to extend 
it to new domains, possibly by modifying it. Over the years I’ve 
developed and applied the model, it has gradually changed. 
There’s still plenty of room for improvement.
4  Readable accounts of research on expert performance include Geoff Colvin, Tal-
ent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-class Performers from Everybody Else 
(New York: Penguin, 2010); Daniel Coyle, The Talent Code. Greatness Isn’t Born. It’s 
Grown. Here’s How (New York: Bantam, 2009); David Shenk, The Genius in All of Us: 
Why Everything You’ve Been Told about Genetics, Talent, and IQ Is Wrong (New York: 
Doubleday, 2010).
5  Email: bmartin@uow.edu.au
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Attacks sometimes backfire. They are counterproductive for the 
attackers. In fact, they are so disastrous for the attackers that 
they wish they had never done anything.
•	 In 1991, Los Angeles police beat a motorist named 
Rodney King, who had been speeding to avoid arrest. 
After a video of the beating was broadcast on television, 
viewers were outraged and public support for the police 
dropped. The beating backfired on the police.
•	 In the 1990s, McDonald’s sued two anarchists, Helen 
Steel and Dave Morris, over their leaflet “What’s wrong 
with McDonald’s?” The legal action was widely seen as 
unfair and led to a huge campaign in support of Steel 
and Morris. It was a public relations disaster for Mc-
Donald’s. Suing Steel and Morris backfired on McDon-
ald’s.
•	 In 2004, media reported on torture of Iraqi prisoners 
in Abu Ghraib prison. The graphic photos showed US 
prison guards grinning as they humiliated and tortured 
the prisoners. Publication of the photos severely dam-
aged the reputation of the US government, especially 
in the Middle East. The torture backfired on the US 
military.
•	 In 1991, thousands of people joined a funeral proces-
sion in Dili, East Timor, using the occasion to peace-
fully protest against the Indonesian occupation. As the 
1. The backfire model
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procession entered Santa Cruz cemetery, Indonesian 
troops suddenly opened fire, killing hundreds of people. 
Western journalists were present and recorded the 
massacre. Their testimony and video evidence triggered 
a huge increase in international support for the East 
Timorese liberation movement and laid the basis for 
independence a decade later. The massacre of peaceful 
protesters backfired on the Indonesian government.
Each of these cases involves an injustice: police brutality, cen-
sorship, torture, massacre. In each case those mounting an at-
tack — the police, McDonald’s, US prison guards, Indonesian 
troops — caused damage to their target. But in each case the 
attack ultimately backfired, causing much greater damage to the 
attacker and its allies.
Backfires can be immensely valuable in aiding efforts against 
injustice. The trouble is, most attacks do not backfire. Most po-
lice beatings receive little or no publicity. Most legal actions for 
defamation are hardly known. Most torture is done in secret. 
Even massacres, which are harder to hide, may generate com-
paratively little concern.
What is going on? Why do some attacks backfire and not 
others?
The Santa Cruz massacre took place during a 1991 
funeral procession to the grave of Sebastião Gomes.
7
 
The backfire model is a way of analysing attacks. It highlights 
actions taken by each side to reduce or increase outrage from a 
perceived injustice. 
The model is not intended to tell people what to do. Activists 
know a lot about the local situation and are in the best position 
to make a judgement about options. The model is a general tool 
that points to the sorts of things that are likely to happen or that 
could happen. It can help activists to choose more wisely.
The backfire model, like any model, is a tool. It doesn’t guar-
antee success. Imagine an army that has the best possible strat-
egy. That’s helpful, but if the army has few troops, is poorly 
trained and has outdated weapons, it’s unlikely to succeed even 
with a brilliant strategy. Likewise, the backfire model can help 
activists develop better strategies, but this isn’t a guarantee for 
success. It is simply one element in a much wider process.
Backfire: the basics
When a powerful group does something unjust, it can take ac-
tion to reduce popular outrage.
In 1960, there were protests across South Africa 
against the racist pass laws. In Sharpeville, police 
opened fire on peaceful protesters, killing perhaps 
a hundred people. The police and government 
tried to reduce outrage, but even so the massacre 
severely damaged the South African government’s 
international reputation.
8
•	 Cover up the action.
•	 Devalue the target.
•	 Reinterpret what happened by lying, minimising, blam-
ing and framing.
•	 Use official channels to give an appearance of justice.
•	 Intimidate or reward people involved.
Torture is universally condemned, so when governments use 
torture, they are likely to use one or more of these techniques 
to reduce outrage.
Cover up the action
Governments usually carry out torture in secret. Sometimes 
torturers use methods, such as beating on the soles of the feet, 
that leave little evidence.
When actions are hidden, outsiders don’t even know about 
them and therefore can’t become concerned.
Devalue the target
Governments claim that prisoners, who are subject to interro-
gation, are terrorists, criminals, subversives or other undesir-
able types. When those who are tortured are perceived as dan-
Abu Ghraib prisoner torture.
9
 
gerous, contemptible or otherwise low in status, then what is 
done to them may not seem so bad.
Reinterpret what happened by lying, minimising, 
blaming and framing
When outsiders claim torture is occurring, governments say it 
isn’t: they lie. They say prisoners are being treated well. 
When certain methods — such as preventing sleep, water-
boarding or sensory deprivation — are known to have been 
used, governments say they aren’t really so bad: no one was se-
riously hurt. The consequences are said not to be so harmful: 
they are minimised. Torture methods are labelled abuse or hu-
miliation or something minor — anything but the word torture. 
Language is used to minimise the seriousness of torture. 
Sometimes, governments blame torture on rogue guards act-
ing without authorisation: the guards are blamed so higher of-
ficials can avoid responsibility.
Governments say they are using legitimate interrogation 
techniques to extract information for urgent purposes. This is 
their point of view. It is a framework or way of looking at the 
world. Presenting things from a viewpoint is called framing.
Use official channels to give an appearance of 
justice
Occasionally, claims about torture become so insistent that gov-
ernments set up an official inquiry, or perhaps prosecute some 
of those involved. Inquiries and courts usually focus on low-
level functionaries, not policy makers, and may apply only light 
penalties. It might look like justice is being done, but it is a to-
ken effort.
Official channels include ombudsmen, courts, commissions 
of inquiry, panels of experts, grievance procedures and any 
other formal process for dealing with problems. Official chan-
nels usually have the effect of reducing public outrage because 
people think the problems are actually being dealt with. Official 
10
channels are slow, so people’s outrage dies down as time passes. 
Official channels use complex procedures and rely on experts, 
such as lawyers, so outsiders have little ability to participate or 
interest in doing so.
Intimidate or reward people involved
Torture is itself a form of intimidation. People who are tortured 
may be afraid to speak out because of the risk of further torture. 
In countries with repressive governments, it can be danger-
ous for others — family members, friends, journalists, human 
rights groups — to protest against torture, because they might 
become targets. On the other hand, officials who do the govern-
ment’s bidding may receive rewards, such as pay or promotions. 
Intimidation discourages the expression of outrage. People 
are afraid of the consequences. The possibility of rewards is a 
temptation to keep quiet or to participate in the actions.
Five methods of reducing outrage and how they 
relate to an event, perceptions of it, and reactions 
to it
What can be done in the face of these five methods that reduce 
outrage from injustice? The answer: counter each one of them. 
Here are the ways.
11
 
•	 Expose what happened.
•	 Validate the target: show the positive aspects of whoever 
or whatever is attacked.
•	 Interpret the events as unjust.
•	 Mobilise support. Avoid or discredit official channels.
•	 Resist intimidation and rewards.
Expose what happened.
Opponents of torture can document it and reveal information 
to the world. This is a primary tool by Amnesty International. 
Exposure challenges cover-up. Photos are especially powerful.
Validate the target: show the positive aspects of 
whoever is attacked.
People who are tortured need to be shown to be human. Photos 
and personal details help to make targets seem like other people 
and challenge degrading labels or mental images.
Interpret the events as unjust.
Information can be provided about what is actually happening 
(to counter lies), about the damaging effects of torture (to coun-
ter minimisation), about who is really responsible (to counter 
blaming) and about the damage caused by torture as well as its 
low value for obtaining information (to counter framing).
Mobilise support. Avoid or discredit official 
channels.
Mobilising support means getting more people to see things 
your way, join your campaigns, and protest against torture. This 
is the primary way to use outrage to challenge injustice. Because 
official channels usually dampen outrage, it is better to avoid 
them, or at least not to rely on them. 
12
Resist intimidation and rewards.
Some people need to stand up in the face of intimidation, for 
example by speaking out about torture. Also useful is docu-
menting and exposing intimidation: this can arouse greater 
outrage and contribute to backfire. Likewise, some people need 
to resist the temptation of getting a reward.
Using these five types of methods increases the likelihood that 
attacks will backfire. However, the outcome of the struggle de-
pends on a wide range of factors.
The backfire model is a guide to the likely tactics used by 
powerful perpetrators of injustice to decrease outrage and the 
sorts of counter-tactics that can increase outrage. It describes 
tactics and counter-tactics, but what actually happens depends 
on the circumstances, the people involved and decisions made. 
After the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the Soviet govern-
ment used various techniques to decrease outrage, but was largely unsuccessful.
13
 
What’s not included in the model
•	 Choice of methods. Should more effort be put into 
exposing injustice or to countering devaluation, or 
something else? Decisions about what method to use 
need to be made by the people involved, based on the 
circumstances.
•	 Timing. When is the best time to expose an injustice? 
Probably not when the media are preoccupied with 
some natural disaster or celebrity story, or when the 
movement is not ready to take advantage of outrage. 
Choosing the right time is crucially important.
•	 Local knowledge. People who are deeply involved with 
an issue know an incredible amount about history, so-
cial dynamics, arguments, personalities and much else. 
The model provides only a general framework. Local 
knowledge is vital to provide insight into what to do 
and when to do it.
•	 Culture and values. What people consider just or unjust 
depends on their culture and prevailing values. The 
model is based on the way things are now — the current 
set of beliefs and behaviours. If people’s beliefs about 
injustice change, a process sometimes influenced by 
campaigning, then the basis for outrage will change.
•	 Long-term change. The model deals with reactions to 
actions. It doesn’t address how to bring about change in 
the longer term.
14
How the model can help
•	 Many activists think mainly about what they are go-
ing to do, such as hold a rally or start a campaign. The 
backfire model draws attention to what opponents will 
do, in particular the tactics powerful opponents will use 
to reduce outrage over injustice.
•	 Some activists think official channels provide a solu-
tion. For example, they sometimes campaign to get the 
government to set up an inquiry. The model points to 
the shortcomings of official channels, especially the way 
they dampen outrage.
•	 Activists often believe that injustice automatically cre-
ates outrage. For example, if police beat protesters or the 
government breaks the law, activists think everyone will 
see how unfair this is. The model shows that powerful 
perpetrators can use a wide range of techniques that 
reduce outrage.
15
 
Something bad has happened, such as sexual harassment, 
unfair dismissal, an environmental disaster, or mass killing. 
Backfire analysis is a way of examining the struggle over how 
people react.
People often react to bad things by being concerned, angry, 
disgusted, upset or outraged.1 I will mostly use the word “out-
rage” but the other descriptions may be just as relevant.
In backfire analysis, the focus is on tactics. Tactics are ac-
tions; they are things that people do. In backfire analysis, it’s not 
so important to explain why things happen.
In looking at tactics, the focus is on how outrage is increased 
or reduced.
Why would you want to undertake a backfire analysis? After 
all, the event has already occurred and there’s nothing that can 
be done about it. First, an analysis can provide insight into tac-
tics used by perpetrators, to learn how they operate and thus be 
better prepared for the next time. Second, a backfire analysis 
can be used to raise people’s awareness about the way struggles 
over outrage occur — it can provide insight. Third, a backfire 
analysis can change the way people react to issues: it can make 
them angry or increase their resolve. As they learn about the 
techniques used by powerful perpetrators — especially about 
intimidation, cover-up and devaluation — they may become 
more sympathetic to the targets of attack. 
1  Sometimes people’s reactions are closer to apathy or despair, which are not so use-
ful for opposing the bad thing.
2. Backfire analysis
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In this chapter, I tell about how to undertake a backfire analy-
sis. The first topic is collecting information: I give three exam-
ples of how this can be done. Then I look at classifying tactics 
under the categories of cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, 
official channels, and intimidation/rewards. Finally, I tell about 
ways to write a backfire story.
Collecting information
To undertake a backfire analysis, you need lots of information. 
This could be from books, articles, blogs, interviews and per-
sonal observations. Let’s say you want to analyse the tactics used 
at a large rally where police assaulted and arrested protesters. 
You can obtain news reports, blogs, photos, and interview ma-
terial — anything that provides information. If the rally was in 
1915, you’ll have to rely entirely on archival documents, as no 
one who was there is still alive. However, perhaps there are cMy 
children or grandchildren or others who heard stories of the 
event.
If the rally occurred recently, you can talk with people who 
were there. That’s a massive job. There might be hundreds or 
even thousands of people. Likewise, if the rally was a major 
news item, there might be hundreds of media stories. You don’t 
need to obtain every possible bit of information — just enough. 
I’ll come back to this.
If possible, you should obtain information from both sides: 
the protesters and the police. So search police media releases, 
news stories quoting police, police newsletters and consider in-
terviewing police. Getting information from different perspec-
tives provides much greater insight into tactics used. Further-
more, by using a range of sources, your analysis will have more 
credibility.
Sometimes there are multiple sides. Maybe politicians or me-
dia commentators have different views than protesters or po-
lice. Here are three examples of how I collected information for 
a backfire analysis.
17
 
Example 1: Rodney King
On 3 March 1991, Los Angeles police arrested a man named 
Rodney King, who had been driving while drunk and fleeing 
police in pursuit. In the course of the arrest, the police used 
tasers against King and hit him with metal batons dozens of 
times. The beating was recorded on videotape by a witness in 
a nearby apartment and later shown on television, leading to a 
massive backlash against the police.
I decided to investigate the King beating as an example of 
backfire. Because the case was so prominent, I assumed there 
would be plenty of material showing techniques for reducing 
and promoting outrage — and I was right. I obtained about ten 
books dealing with the beating, some from the police side, some 
from King’s side and some not taking a strong position. There 
are also some good articles. I read through the books, taking 
notes whenever I came across instances of methods affecting 
outrage. For example, I read about the “police code of silence,” 
an unwritten rule that officers never report on abuses by fellow 
officers. I found out that 20 police were present at the arrest, but 
not a single one reported any problem. This fitted the category 
of cover-up. The police code of silence meant that none of the 
20 police was likely to reveal what they saw, even if they thought 
the beating was too harsh.
Still from the video of the beating of Rodney King
18
Because there was so much printed material, I decided not to 
seek interviews. After all, journalists and investigators had al-
ready interviewed all the key people, sometimes in great depth, 
so I could rely on their accounts. Sometimes there were minor 
discrepancies between what different sources said, so I had to 
decide what to say, if anything, about these points.2
Example 2: The dismissal of Ted Steele
In 2001, Ted Steele, a tenured associate professor in biology, was 
dismissed from the University of Wollongong — where I work. 
Steele had been commenting to the media about “soft marking,” 
namely giving some students higher grades than they deserved. 
The Vice-Chancellor, without warning, fired Steele. This created 
enormous media attention, with Steele being defended on free 
speech grounds. The dismissal produced much extensive bad 
publicity for the university over a lengthy period: it backfired.
Normally I prefer not to analyse cases at any organisation 
where I’m personally involved. It’s better if an outsider does it, 
because they can approach the issues in a more balanced way 
and have more credibility due to being independent. However, 
despite the extensive coverage of the dismissal and subsequent 
court proceedings, no one undertook an in-depth analysis, so 
I decided to write an article about the case, in part to defend 
the Department of Biological Sciences, caught in the cross-fire 
between Steele’s allegations and the uproar over his dismissal.
I decided not to conduct interviews, as there was plenty of 
published material about the events. As an academic at the uni-
versity, I did have one advantage: access to emails going back 
years, from Steele and others, in particular about Steele’s chal-
lenges to the university administration. Also, I attended a cru-
cial meeting of the local branch of the National Tertiary Educa-
tion Union — covering academics across Australia — at which 
the issue of supporting Steele was discussed. (Many of Steele’s 
2  Brian Martin, “The beating of Rodney King: the dynamics of backfire,” Critical 
Criminology, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, pp. 307–326.
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colleagues in Biological Sciences did not want to support him.) 
After my letter about the dismissal was published in a newspa-
per, more people talked to me about the case, and I picked up 
information from a number of them. I always checked claims 
with more than one person.
After I wrote a draft of my article, I sent it to all key players, 
including Steele, the Vice-Chancellor, members of Biological 
Sciences, and union officials. Only some of them replied; feed-
back from those who did allowed me to modify a few points. 
Because the case was current, I needed to be extra careful in 
what I said.3 
Example 3: Freedom Flotilla to Gaza, 2010
In May 2010, a flotilla of six ships set out to deliver humani-
tarian supplies to Gaza, challenging the Israeli government’s 
blockade. Israeli commandoes attacked the flotilla, killing nine 
3  Brian Martin, “Boomerangs of academic freedom,” Workplace: A Journal for Aca-
demic Labor, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2005, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/05workplace.html.
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passengers and detaining the rest. Many were injured, including 
some commandoes. The attack on the flotilla generated news 
coverage around the world and was a massive public relations 
disaster for the Israeli government.
Most of the commentary was about what happened and 
whether it was justified. I decided to write a short backfire anal-
ysis to highlight the tactics used by the Israeli government to 
decrease outrage. There was plenty of detailed media coverage 
to rely on, plus online materials from flotilla members. I didn’t 
try to read it all — that would have taken too long, because 
I wanted to finish in weeks rather than months. My analysis 
undoubtedly could have been improved by gaining more infor-
mation from Israeli sources and from flotilla participants. How-
ever, there was more than enough information for my purposes: 
a short, quick analysis.4
Information and its quality
To make a backfire analysis, you need information about what 
happened. That’s not always easy. In high profile cases, like the 
beating of Rodney King or the attack on the flotilla, there is a lot 
of public information. In other cases — arrest of a local activist, 
for example — there may not be much information unless you 
talk to people involved. And maybe the police won’t want to 
talk with you or give you any information.
Even if you obtain some information, you need to judge its 
quality. People will lie to you, hide crucial information and 
sometimes try to discourage you from commenting, for exam-
ple by threatening to sue for defamation. They might produce 
elaborate stories that confuse and distort matters. So when you 
gather information, you need to take the usual precautions of 
a researcher or investigative journalist: judge the quality of the 
evidence, assess the credibility of the source and obtain infor-
mation from multiple independent sources. As you start to put 
4  Brian Martin, “Flotilla tactics: how an Israeli attack backfired,” Truthout, 27 July 
2010.
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together a story, you may want to probe further into some is-
sues, especially concerning cover-up and intimidation, where 
deception and distortion are most likely.
Taking sides
You need to be prepared for incredibly strong viewpoints, pas-
sionately expressed, sometimes conflicting on basic points. For 
example, the 1994 Rwandan genocide is often presented as a 
mass killing of Tutsis by Hutus. However, many “moderate” 
Hutus were also killed: the killing wasn’t just based on ethnic-
ity: politics was also involved. Then there is the complication of 
killings by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. Some sup-
porters of the RPF are disturbed by any suggestion of killings 
by Tutsis.
These sorts of differences mean that backfire analysis can-
not be neutral. You can decide to focus on methods used by 
the Rwandan government during the genocide that decrease 
Deep gashes delivered by the killers are visible in the skulls that fill one room at 
the Murambi School.
22
outrage,5 or you might decide to look at ways used by the RPF 
to decrease outrage about atrocities committed by its members. 
Or you could do both. Even if you do both, you might end up 
with an unbalanced analysis because more information is avail-
able about one side’s actions than the other’s, or because one 
side’s atrocities are significantly worse than the other’s. 
The 9/11 attacks can be analysed as a backfire process. The 
al Qaeda terrorists did very little to discourage outrage. Their 
attack was out in the open: there was little cover-up about the 
action, though some about responsibility for it. Al Qaeda had 
little capacity to devalue the victims and hardly any prospect of 
using official channels. After 9/11, Al Qaeda had little capacity 
for further intimidation. On the other hand, the bombing of Af-
ghanistan, a reprisal action initiated in October 2001, six weeks 
after 9/11, killed thousands of civilians but generated hardly any 
outrage in the west compared to 9/11.6 When you undertake a 
5  This is what I did in “Managing outrage over genocide: case study Rwanda,” Global 
Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2009, pp. 275–290.
6  Brendan Riddick, “The bombing of Afghanistan: the convergence of media and 
My Lai Masacre In 1968 during the Indochina war, 
US troops killed hundreds of Vietnamese civilians 
in the village of My Lai. Covered up for a year, the 
massacre eventually generated a huge adverse pub-
lic reaction against the US government and its war 
policy.
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backfire analysis, you make a choice: look at 9/11, the bombing 
of Afghanistan — or something else. 
Classifying methods
The five methods — cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, 
official channels and intimidation/rewards — are a conveni-
ent way to classify possible ways of decreasing outrage. There is 
nothing sacred about the five methods: they sometimes overlap, 
and they can be broken down into sub-methods. However, it 
can be useful to think through the differences between them.
Cover-up is anything that prevents people becoming aware that 
something is happening. It can also be called hiding or disguis-
ing. 
political power to reduce outrage,” Revista de Paz y Conflictos, No. 5, 2012, pp. 6-19.
At least 10 Afghan civilians, including eight schoolchildren, have been killed in 
fighting involving Western troops in Narang district of Kunar Province in Af-
ghanistan 27 December 2009.
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Cover-up is often the most effective way to prevent outrage. 
If no one knows about a murder, no one can become upset. For 
many abuses, cover-up is the initial method used, and it may be 
so effective that other methods aren’t needed. However, if cov-
er-up is unsuccessful, attackers may then use other techniques.
Cover-up is in relation to audiences. For example, journalists 
might know about political corruption, but if the mass media 
do not report the story, then the corruption has been covered 
up in relation to the general public.
Censorship is not quite the same as cover-up: censorship is 
actively preventing access to information or something else, 
usually by some law or policy (though sometimes censorship is 
secret: the existence of censorship is covered up). Cover-up can 
occur by means other than censorship. 
For example, many police beatings are unknown to the pol-
ic.7 The police involved do not tell anyone except perhaps other 
police, who maintain secrecy. The victims of the beatings might 
not tell anyone because of embarrassment or because they are 
afraid of further police harassment or assaults (this is the tac-
tic of intimidation). When journalists hear about beatings, they 
may not report them because they accept the point of view of 
the police (this is the reinterpretation tactic of framing). There 
is no official censorship of police beatings, but information 
about them is restricted. This is a type of de facto cover-up: it 
happens through a combination of processes.
Devaluation is lowering the status or opinion of a person, group 
or object. Prejudices, such as racism or sexism, are forms of de-
valuation, sometimes deeply embedded in a culture. Devaluing 
can also be an active process, for example labelling someone as 
a deviant, criminal or terrorist. Another way to devalue some-
7  Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police 
Brutality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Mary 
Prosser, Abbe Smith, and William Talley, Jr.; Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law 
School for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Beyond 
the Rodney King Story: An Investigation of Police Misconduct in Minority Communities 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995).
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one is by spreading damaging information, for example about 
membership in an unpopular organisation.
The function of devaluation is to make the target seem un-
worthy, so that whatever is done to them doesn’t seem so bad. 
Some people will think it’s okay to beat or jail a terrorist, so it 
can be effective to say that opponents are terrorists, even if they 
are really better described as protesters or environmental activ-
ists.
Devaluation is widely used, even when backfire is not likely. 
Unemployed people are called lazy and women who are raped 
are called sluts. These are examples of blaming the victim.8 Pro-
testers are called rabble, rent-a-crowd, malcontents, criminals 
or terrorists.
8  Blaming the victim has a long history. The classic treatment is William Ryan, 
Blaming the Victim (New York: Vintage, 1972).
One of the Abu Ghraib photos
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Reinterpretation is describing an injustice in a different way, 
so that it doesn’t seem so bad or maybe not an injustice at all. 
There are many ways to do this, so it’s convenient to use several 
classifications: lying, minimising, blaming and framing.
Lying is a direct way of misleading people. A famous lie was the 
claim, before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, that there was strong 
evidence Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons and links to al 
Qaeda.
Often there’s a close link between lying and cover-up. When 
something isn’t ever mentioned at all, this can be part of a cover-
up. The US government’s lies about Saddam Hussein involved 
covering up some information, such as intelligence reports. The 
lies serve as reinterpretation because many people were oppos-
ing an invasion and contesting the US government’s justifica-
tions.
Strictly speaking, a person is lying only if they are consciously 
aware of deceiving others. There are two main types of lies. One 
is not revealing the truth, sometimes called lying by omission. 
The other is telling a falsehood. When someone is convinced 
what they are saying is true, it’s not a lie, even if everyone else 
thinks it’s wrong. When President George W. Bush suggested 
that Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons and links to al Qae-
da, did he actually believe what he was saying? It’s hard to say 
for sure. However, when classifying tactics, falsehoods like this 
fit into the category of reinterpretation.
Minimising is saying things aren’t as bad as you might think. 
For example, after the Dili massacre — at which hundreds were 
killed — Indonesian government officials said 19 people had 
died. Later they raised this to 50. The actual figure, according to 
an independent inquiry, was 271. 
Sometimes minimising is a type of lying, one that distorts the 
truth in a direction preferred by the attacker. Like lying, mini-
mising is different from cover-up. The Indonesian government 
initially tried to prevent any information about the Dili mas-
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sacre getting to the outside world: it tried to cover up. Its state-
ment about 19 deaths only came after claims about a massacre 
had been made, and therefore fits the category of reinterpreta-
tion better.
Another sort of minimising is in descriptions of torture tech-
niques, saying they are not really so bad. Commentators might 
say that sleep deprivation is not really all that hurtful or harm-
ful.
Blaming is saying that someone else did it or should be held 
responsible. Attackers often try to blame the victims. When po-
lice beat protesters, the police may claim the protesters attacked 
them. This overlaps with the tactic of devaluation.
A different sort of blaming occurs when lots of people be-
come outraged over an injustice. Some of those being held re-
sponsible may try to blame others involved. After the 1991 beat-
ing of Rodney King was broadcast on national television, Los 
Angeles police chief Daryl Gates blamed the police who made 
the arrest. Some of these police in turn blamed Gates.
Usually it’s easier for powerful figures to blame lower-level 
functionaries. After the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 
Iraq was exposed in 2004, the US government blamed the pris-
on officers involved. No senior US officials were charged with 
offences, even though it could be argued that they were respon-
sible for the policies that allowed or encouraged torture.
Framing is a way of looking at the world. Imagine you are on 
the outside of a house, looking in through a small window. Your 
view depends on the window: you look through the window 
frame. Someone else looks inside the same house through a dif-
ferent window and gets a different impression, because they are 
looking from a different direction, into a different room, and 
perhaps their window has glass that colours or distorts the view.
Framing contests occur when different people look at the 
same thing — such as the house — from different perspectives. 
People say their frame is the correct one.
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Consider a protest march. The protesters see themselves as 
expressing their viewpoints and exercising free speech. Govern-
ment leaders, on the other hand, see the protesters as a danger-
ous threat to social order and to the government’s legitimate 
role as policy maker. The protesters use a frame of participation 
and free speech, whereas the government uses a frame of social 
order and social control.
When police assault a protester, the protesters see this as po-
lice brutality. The police look at it entirely differently: they are 
doing their job to stop threats to public order and violations of 
the law, and following procedures.
Frames are incredibly powerful and help explain why peo-
ple believe what they believe and act the way they do. Activists 
sometimes assume that police or politicians are cynical, corrupt 
and evil because “they couldn’t possibly believe what they’re do-
ing is right.” The trouble is, they could indeed believe it, and 
probably do, because they see things using a different perspec-
tive. 
When politicians start off believing they are right — because 
they have inside information and are convinced they have the 
best interests of the country at heart — they then believe they 
have a responsibility to protect society from dangerous threats. 
Protesters are seen as a dangerous threat, so for politicians it 
become legitimate to put protesters under surveillance, pass re-
pressive laws and use heavy police powers. From their perspec-
tive, lying is legitimate because it serves a greater purpose, de-
valuation of protesters is just telling the truth and intimidation 
is justified because protesters are seen as threatening enemies.
Framing, when based on sincere belief, is the only reinter-
pretation technique that can be considered legitimate. After all, 
people should be able to believe what they like, even if they end 
up with a distorted view of the world. It is legitimate to hold 
a belief, but problems arise if you try to impose that belief on 
others or to promote it through techniques such as lying and 
intimidation.
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Official channels include grievance procedures, expert panels, 
appeals to politicians, ombudsmen, official investigations, and 
courts. Official channels can also be called formal procedures. 
Official channels are processes that are supposed to provide jus-
tice, fairness or truth.
In some cases, official channels work just as they are sup-
posed to. A person commits a crime like murder, is arrested, 
tried and sentenced. Justice is seen to be done.
However, when a government, powerful corporation or mili-
tary commits a crime, official channels may not work so well: 
they may give only the appearance of fairness. Because many 
people believe official channels dispense justice, outrage de-
clines even though justice has not been done.
The role of official channels in reducing outrage is the most 
counter-intuitive feature of the backfire model. Activists often 
demand government action: they call for an inquiry into pover-
ty or prison violence. They may initiate court cases, for example 
against police brutality or nuclear power.
In 1984, a leak in a chemical plant in India killed thousands and injured hun-
dreds of thousands of people. The owner of the plant, the US-based company 
Union Carbide, used numerous techniques to reduce public outrage.
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Sometimes using official channels is a good option. The back-
fire model doesn’t say never to use them. What it says is that 
official channels tend to reduce outrage over injustice, largely 
because so many people believe that if some official body is 
dealing with the problem, they don’t need to be so concerned 
about it themselves.
Official channels also dampen outrage in other ways.
•	 They are slow. Inquiries and court cases can take 
months or even years. During this time, people’s initial 
passions may die down, and other issues arise, compet-
ing for attention.
•	 They are procedural. They involve all sorts of detailed 
rules, regulations and formalities. In court cases, rules 
of evidence are followed. Often this means that most at-
tention is on technicalities — minor points of procedure 
— and not on the central injustice.
•	 They rely on experts. A lot of knowledge and experience 
is needed to operate effectively using grievance proce-
dures, government inquiries, expert panels and court 
cases. This means most people are excluded or lose in-
terest. Official channels are low in public participation. 
They are good way to transform a mass campaign into a 
struggle between a few experts.
When powerful perpetrators turn to or set up official chan-
nels, like inquiries into massacres, they are moving the issue 
from the public arena into a different arena: law or bureaucracy. 
Campaigners need to be aware of this.
Powerful perpetrators prefer official channels they can influ-
ence or control. They prefer internal inquiries, not independ-
ent inquiries: they would rather have the police investigate po-
lice brutality than set up an independent inquiry. They prefer 
closed inquiries, not open public inquiries: they would rather 
have courts closed to journalists than run an open court. They 
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typically try to establish terms of reference — namely, the topics 
the inquiry is supposed to deal with — that are narrow, so the 
potential impact will be reduced.
 The trouble is that closed internal inquiries with narrow 
terms of reference don’t have as much credibility. So sometimes 
governments set up open, independent, wide-ranging inquiries 
and hope for the best.
On some rare occasions, an inquiry becomes a form of cam-
paigning. In the mid 1990s in the Australian state of New South 
Wales, there was a royal commission into police . The commis-
sion held public hearings that generated massive news coverage. 
Even more dramatically, a few corrupt police turned informants 
and gathered video evidence of deals. Broadcast on television, 
this made it impossible for the government to avoid taking seri-
ous reform measures.9
However, for every campaigning commission like this, there 
are dozens of others that are far tamer. Some of them operate 
in secrecy or with minimal publicity, so there is little pressure 
for change. Some of them produce findings that reaffirm the 
government’s position. Yet others generate enlightened and 
progressive recommendations, which is fine, except that gov-
ernments never implement them. 
When analysing the role of official channels in relation to 
public outrage, it’s useful to think of a wide range of organi-
sations and processes that can serve as official channels. For 
example, seeking support from a politician can serve as an of-
ficial channel, especially if the politician promises to help but 
doesn’t deliver or takes a long time. An election is a type of of-
ficial channel: it gives legitimacy to the system of government. 
That’s why many dictators run elections. Even when they are 
fraudulent and staged, they can give the appearance, at least to 
some people, of legitimacy.10
9  Rodney Tiffen, Scandals: Media, Politics and Corruption in Contemporary Aus-
tralia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999).
10  Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control and 
Popular Acquiescence (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982).
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Intimidation is any threat or attack that discourages the expres-
sion of outrage. A government employee would like to speak 
out about corruption but is afraid of reprisals such as dismissal. 
A journalist would like to write about corruption but the editor 
or publisher is afraid of being sued. A victim of police brutality 
might wish to speak out but is afraid of additional police harass-
ment.
Intimidation is somewhat different from the other tactics, 
which are designed to reduce outrage; intimidation doesn’t nec-
essarily reduce the feeling of outrage, but instead discourages 
people from acting on their feelings.
In some cases, intimidation is both the attack and the means 
of deterring the expression of outrage. When police beat pro-
testers, this can cause outrage but at the same time frighten 
some protesters from exposing what happened. 
Some forms of intimidation are overt and obvious, like beat-
ings and shootings. Others are more subtle, such as a menacing 
look, a hint of a legal action, or police photographers at a rally.
For perpetrators, intimidation has one big disadvantage: it 
can cause additional outrage. Imagine a journalist reporting 
on a protest. If the journalist is threatened, beaten or arrested, 
this can lead the journalist to make greater efforts to expose the 
issues, as happened in East Timor in 1991 and with the Gaza 
flotilla in 2010. The same sort of thing can happen when police 
threaten or hurt protesters, many of whom have the technology 
and skills to publicise abuses.
Because intimidation is widely seen as wrong, it is often hid-
den. Police do not announce they are going to harass someone 
they have beaten. Intimidation often goes hand in hand with 
cover-up.
Rewards are any sort of benefit, incentive or bribe that makes 
people less likely to express outrage. Lawyers who worked for 
McDonald’s prosecuting the defamation action against Helen 
Steel and Dave Morris were amply rewarded for their work. 
It can be very difficult to find evidence of this sort of effect. 
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There is little evidence that any Los Angeles police felt any 
outrage over the beating of Rodney King, so it’s impossible to 
know whether potential rewards made any difference to their 
behaviour. Likewise, it’s hard to know whether lawyers work-
ing for McDonald’s thought the McLibel defamation case was 
misguided. Lawyers regularly work on cases they don’t believe 
in, and typically think this is part of their job.
Rewards are a parallel process to intimidation. The idea with 
both methods is that people might feel outrage but are poten-
tially discouraged from expressing it, by fear of the consequenc-
es (intimidation) or the promise of some benefit (rewards). 
That’s the reason these two methods are grouped together in 
the backfire model as one category. It would be quite okay to 
separate them. 
Because it’s so hard to find solid evidence of rewards, often 
it’s easier not to mention them in a backfire analysis. Intimida-
tion is more obvious because it’s directed at the target of the at-
tack and at allies of the target, whereas allies of the perpetrator 
receive the incentives.
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There are a few cases of bribery of targets. Whistleblowers 
— people who speak out in the public interest — are often met 
with reprisals such as harassment, reprimands, ostracism, de-
motion and dismissal. These reprisals are a potential source of 
outrage. When whistleblowers go to court for unfair dismissal 
or to obtain compensation, they may receive a settlement of-
fer: a payout. A common condition of the settlement is that 
the whistleblower sign an agreement not to comment publicly 
about the settlement or the original issue. To get the money, the 
whistleblower has to keep quiet. It’s a type of bribe.
Sometimes the benefit from remaining a bystander or tacit 
collaborator is simply to be left alone. Employees who see cor-
rupt behaviour often say nothing because they know there 
might be repercussions if they do. The “reward” of being left 
alone can also be seen in terms of the tactic of intimidation: em-
ployees are afraid of reprisals. This suggests the close connec-
tion that sometimes occurs between intimidation and rewards. 
When targets reduce outrage
Tactics that reduce outrage are most commonly used by perpe-
trators and their allies. Torturers keep quiet about their work 
and so do governments. But sometimes victims contribute. Vic-
tims of torture are often highly traumatised and fearful. They 
may not feel safe enough to speak out about their experiences. 
When they remain silent, they contribute to cover-up. 
It would be absurd to blame torture victims for cover-up. 
When doing a backfire analysis, the purpose is to understand 
the processes that contribute to greater outrage. Because torture 
victims have been subject to extreme intimidation, others may 
need to speak on their behalf.
Workers who have been bullied on the job often feel humili-
ated and violated. Sometimes they begin to believe what every-
one else seems to believe, that they are responsible for what is 
happening to them. The result is that many bullied workers are 
unwilling to tell others about their experiences, or perhaps are 
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willing to tell only friends and not anyone else. They can be said 
to be contributing to cover-up. This is perfectly understand-
able and the greatest care is needed when suggesting to bullied 
workers that they speak out.
Many people believe in the power of official channels to dis-
pense justice. Bullied workers often make complaints to their 
bosses and higher managers, make formal grievances, or go 
to court. Sometimes these appeals are effective; in many cases, 
though, they are worse than nothing. Appeal processes can in-
volve attempts to discredit the worker that are experienced like 
a continuation of the bullying.11
In terms of the backfire model, the key point is that using 
official channels is likely to dampen outrage. If the goal is to 
mobilise support, then it’s often better to avoid official channels 
or use them as a tool in campaigning. However, not everyone 
understands how powerful it can be to mobilise support; some 
of those who do understand may want to use official channels 
anyway. 
The key point here is that targets of injustice sometimes con-
11  Deborah Osborne, “Pathways into bullying,” Proceedings of the 4th Asia Pacific 
Conference on Educational Integrity, Wollongong, 2009, http://ro.uow.edu.au/ap-
cei/09/papers/18/.
Terrorists often use methods that increase 
public opposition to the activities.
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tribute to reducing outrage. Often there are good reasons for 
this that should be respected. Sometimes, though, targets do 
not realise they are playing into the hands of perpetrators.
When perpetrators increase outrage
According to the backfire model, powerful perpetrators of in-
justice can use various methods that reduce outrage over their 
actions. But sometimes attackers seem to ignore these methods 
or even do the exact opposite — they do things that increase 
outrage!
Beginning in 2002, President George W. Bush and other sen-
ior US officials signalled their intentions to launch an invasion 
of Iraq. An illegal, aggressive war was likely to trigger oppo-
sition, but rather than hide their plans, they trumpeted them 
widely. This helped to stimulate a massive resistance, of which 
the most dramatic moment was the largest protest gathering 
in history on 15 February 2003, with millions of people in the 
streets in cities around the world.
This can be contrasted with the approach used by US Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, when military aggression 
against the government and people of Nicaragua was disguised. 
The US government, rather than directly attacking Nicaragua, 
provided covert assistance to the Contras. This partial cover-up 
of the aggression meant that it was much harder to generate 
opposition.
Sometimes attackers are quite open about their actions and 
motivations because they believe there is no significant opposi-
tion or because they are arrogant and think they can do what 
they like, or because they need to mobilise support for their ap-
proach. Some open attacks serve as a powerful form of intimi-
dation. 
Then there is terrorism: attacks on civilians as a means of 
sending a message to audiences.12 Terrorists have different aims. 
12  On this communication model of terrorism, see Alex P. Schmid and Janny de 
Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media 
(London: Sage, 1982). See also Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Cen-
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Some seek revenge for previous injustices. Some seek attention 
to their cause through dramatic actions. Others are more stra-
tegic: they hope to trigger a reaction from their targets — for 
example, increased repression — that is so strong that it will 
mobilise greater support for their cause, namely backfire in 
their favour.
Whatever the rationale, terrorist actions seem designed to 
maximise outrage. Think of 9 September 2001: the attacks on 
civilians were in broad daylight, enabling maximum public-
ity; they were not hidden. The attackers had little capacity to 
devalue their targets or to use official channels or intimida-
tion against their opponents. The result: a giant backfire in the 
form of popular support for the US government and people, 
the bombing of Afghanistan and a massive expansion of the US 
security system.
The lesson: do not assume perpetrators always do everything 
possible to reduce outrage. Inadvertently or on purpose, they 
sometimes do the exact opposite.
tral Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002); Joseph S. Tuman, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions 
of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003).
World Trade Center Attacked September 11 2001
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Writing a backfire story
You’ve collected material about tactics used in a case of injus-
tice. You have information about cover-up, devaluation and so 
forth. You’re ready to write the story. How should you organise 
the material? 
1. Story, then analysis13
You first tell the story of what happened, for example back-
ground, the massacre and the consequences, giving all relevant 
details as you go along. After telling the story, you point out the 
tactics used, first cover-up, then devaluation and so forth. 
This approach has the advantage of allowing a full narrative, 
uninterrupted by references to theory as you go along. It’s also 
fairly easy to write. The disadvantage is that readers may not be 
able to hold the full narrative in their heads, so when you get to 
the analysis of tactics, they may not remember relevant details.
2. Story with analysis along the way14
You construct the story so that you can do the analysis of tactics 
as you go. You might start describing those elements of the sto-
ry involving cover-up, then devaluation and so on. Sometimes a 
brief summary of events at the beginning is helpful. 
This construction provides both a narrative and vivid links to 
tactics. However, it can be challenging to tell the story this way. 
You might need to backtrack on the time sequence or refer to 
key events more than once.
3. Analysis illustrated by examples15
You systematically describe the tactics used. For each tactic — 
cover-up, etc. — you use a variety of examples. In analysing tac-
tics used with torture, you might use examples from different 
places and times.
13  Examples are chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Justice Ignited.
14  Examples are chapters 5, 8, 9 and 10 of Justice Ignited.
15  Examples are chapters 6, 11 and 12 of Justice Ignited.
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This approach highlights the analysis while retaining the 
power of examples. It lacks the power of narrative and poten-
tially can be criticised as picking examples to suit the analysis.
There’s no ideal way to write about backfire. These are three 
general approaches; there are many others. How to proceed 
depends on your audience, your material and your purpose. A 
lengthy academic treatment will be quite different in tone and 
structure to a short treatment aimed at activists.
Writing: how to go about it
Most researchers collect lots of information, taking notes along 
the way, and then sit down to write about what they’ve found. 
This can work well with small projects but becomes increas-
ingly dysfunctional when there is lots of material. 
An alternative approach is to start writing the article from 
Mohandas Gandhi wrote almost every day. His 
collected works are 100 volumes.
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the beginning, based on what you already know, and to add to it 
bit by bit. Robert Boice in his studies with writers and academ-
ics found that those who did small amounts of writing each day, 
day after day, had much higher productivity than those who 
didn’t write anything until prodded into a burst of frenzied ef-
fort, often because of a deadline.16 Writing to deadlines can be 
called bingeing. It feels so stressful that you don’t want to repeat 
it very soon.
To use Boice’s approach, you should write a little bit on the 
article each day, maybe writing new text for 5 to 20 minutes 
and then spending a similar period editing what you’ve already 
written. When you come to something you don’t already know, 
leave a note to yourself about what you need to look up. 
The advantage is that your mind works through the rest 
of the day, mostly unconsciously, dealing with the issues and 
helping you put them into a logical framework. You save time 
because instead of reading vast quantities before writing, your 
daily writing provides a framework. You don’t need to read as 
16  Robert Boice, Advice for New Faculty Members: Nihil Nimus (Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon, 2000).
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much because you know what you’re looking for.
When you finish a first draft and have gone over it to polish 
it, it’s time to obtain comments. Tara Gray, who turned Boice’s 
approach into a programme for publishing,17 recommends 
sending your draft first to non-experts, people who don’t know 
a lot about the topic. Suppose you’re writing about tactics used 
by the US government that decrease outrage from the bomb-
ing of Afghanistan beginning in October 2001. First you show 
your draft paper to people who haven’t studied the Afghanistan 
war and who are unfamiliar with the backfire model. They will 
make comments and ask questions that help you to clarify your 
argument. For example, they might ask how you know there 
were civilian casualties or what you mean by official channels. 
After you make changes based on the comments from non-
experts, next send your article to experts in the area, if possible 
to experts in the topic area — the bombing of Afghanistan — 
and experts on backfire tactics. They will be able to comment on 
facts and interpretations. 
Why bother sending your article to non-experts? Surely the 
experts know best! The trouble is that experts are so famil-
iar with the subject matter that they may not notice that you 
haven’t explained concepts clearly or organised your material 
logically. The experts already know the concepts and may not 
notice problems in exposition because the content is obvious 
to them.
Most of your readers will probably be non-experts, so you 
need to communicate to them. However, if you make mistakes, 
you can lose credibility, especially if there are critics of your 
analysis. You need input from experts to help make your treat-
ment more accurate.
The combination of regular writing and seeking feedback on 
drafts from non-experts and experts can result in a highly effec-
tive piece of writing. The more you write, the better you get, as 
long as you keep trying to improve.
17  Tara Gray, Publish & Flourish: Become a Prolific Scholar (Teaching Academy, New 
Mexico State University, 2005).
Publishing
Where should you publish your backfire analysis? This depends 
on your intended audience and your purpose.
Your primary audience might be activists, members of a par-
ticular organisation, or anyone interested. Thinking about your 
intended audience is important, because it should influence the 
language you use, the amount of information, the length and 
appearance of your publication.
Academic articles can be useful for providing detailed docu-
mentation and rigorous argument. But usual academic style of 
writing is seldom appealing for non-specialists (or even for spe-
cialists!). So if you want to reach a broader readership, you can 
write something that is shorter, tells a story, provides plenty of 
examples and is clearly expressed. You can find good examples 
on websites for political commentary.
An article is one option. You can also consider a slide show, a 
radio programme, a video or a poster. You can think of different 
formats, such as a debate, a diary or a mystery. 
The way to proceed depends on your purpose. You may want 
to inform audiences, for example to help activists think about 
how to be more effective, or to alert members of the public to 
an important issue. You may want to contribute to a greater un-
derstanding of the issue or of the process of backfire. You may 
want to develop your skills in analysis, writing, publishing or 
interaction with audiences. The more you produce, the more 
you develop your skills and the more effective you can be in 
raising awareness.
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You’re planning to do something and there’s a chance of being 
attacked. What should you do? Th e backfi re model can provide 
guidance.
•	 You work for a company and have discovered evidence 
of corruption. You’re thinking of speaking out about it. 
•	 You’re planning a rally and are concerned about the 
possibility of police violence.
•	 Your group has taken a leading role in opposing a pow-
erful politician. You’re worried about reprisals.
In cases like these, you need to think through possible risks and 
plan accordingly. You want to prepare so that you’re less likely 
to be attacked and so that, if you are attacked, it might backfi re 
on the attacker.
3. Preparing
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The way to go about this is to start by thinking of what your 
opponent might do — namely, attack — and what the opponent 
might do to reduce outrage over the attack. The likely methods 
are cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels 
and intimidation.  
Corruption
You work for a company and have discovered evidence of corrup-
tion. You’re thinking of speaking out about it.1 
This is an example of individual action that makes you vulner-
able to attack. Similar dynamics are involved in resisting bul-
lying, racism, sexism — any sort of unfairness or abuse that is 
endorsed or tolerated by managers. You need to look at what 
opponents might do that reduces outrage, starting with cover-
up.
Cover-up
You can predict that the attacker will use some methods to cov-
er up what they do or the responsibility for it. Of course those 
involved in the corruption try to keep it hidden. As soon as you 
speak out, they will know they are being exposed and will take 
further steps to cover up. So think about what they might do.
They might destroy evidence. That means that you need to 
collect every possible bit of evidence beforehand. It’s risky going 
to the police and asking them to do a raid, because if the corrupt 
operators get a whiff of the raid, they will destroy documents in 
advance. They might have contacts in the police.
1  On whistleblowing, see for example C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives 
and Organizational Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Myron Peretz 
Glazer and Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Govern-
ment and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Geoffrey Hunt, ed., Whistleblowing 
in the Social Services: Public Accountability and Professional Practice (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1998); Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Organi-
zational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees (New York: Lexington 
Books, 1992); Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing 
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse on the Job (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).
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Suppose you’ve collected plenty of evidence. Where have you 
saved it? A file on your computer? Maybe the corrupt opera-
tors will decide to steal your computer or pay someone to steal 
it, making it look like a regular burglary. So you need to make 
sure you have back-up copies: full sets of all the evidence in safe 
keeping with several friends or lawyers.
Devaluation
If you speak out about corruption — in other words, you be-
come a whistleblower — you might imagine that you will be 
praised for your courage and commitment. Think again. Those 
involved with the corruption, or who have tolerated it, would 
rather reduce outrage. What better way than to discredit you? 
Andrew Wilkie, an intelligence analyst who in 
2003 spoke out about shortcomings of the Aus-
tralian government’s case for joining the inva-
sion of Iraq. The Australian government used 
various techniques to discredit Wilkie, but he 
effectively countered them.
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So they might spread rumours about you: your poor perfor-
mance, your sexual behaviour, your frauds and deceits, or your 
personality disorders. Some rumours might have an element of 
truth; others might be totally fabricated. They might go through 
your personnel file, looking for the slightest bit of evidence to 
hurt your reputation. Perhaps someone complained about you 
5 or 10 years ago. That will be publicised and exaggerated into 
a major flaw. You might be harassed and provoked so that you 
crack and yell at someone to stop; then the fact that you yelled 
will be used to discredit you. Every negative aspect of your job 
evaluations will be trumpeted to anyone who cares to listen.
These things might not happen — but they could. So you need 
to be prepared. Before you speak out, you need to gather all 
available evidence of your good performance and pleasant per-
sonality. Save copies of all your glowing job evaluations. Obtain 
statements from your bosses and co-workers. Gather every bit 
of documentation you can about your good character and be 
prepared to use it to counter attacks on your credibility.
You need to be prepared for efforts to provoke you into doing 
something that’s seen as inappropriate. That means that when 
others make nasty comments or do things they know will an-
noy you, you need to resist the temptation to shout, storm off or 
make rude comments. Of course you might be completely justi-
fied, but this isn’t about what’s fair, it’s about what’s effective. To 
be effective, you need to behave impeccably, better than anyone 
else. If possible, you need to find others who will speak on your 
behalf, saying what a conscientious and nice person you are.
Maybe there are a few things you’d rather people didn’t know 
about, maybe a drunken escapade or a time you made a mess of 
your job. Be prepared for these stories to be made public, much 
more public than you’d like. If this sort of bad publicity is go-
ing to hurt you and your loved ones more than you can handle, 
then now is the time to reconsider whether to speak out. Are 
there other options?
One option is to find someone else to speak out, some co-
worker who has less to lose. This isn’t easy, but it’s possible.
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Another option is to get another job, in a secure situation 
with a sympathetic boss, and then speak out. Your old employ-
ers — the corrupt ones — might still try to discredit you, but 
they won’t be able to provoke you into unwise behaviours.
Yet another option is to leak documents and remain anony-
mous. You can find a sympathetic journalist or action group to 
give the documents to, or, if the issue is big enough, post them 
on WikiLeaks or another online repository.2 If you are anony-
mous, it is much harder to discredit you, and furthermore you 
remain on the job, able to collect more material. But be pre-
pared for all sorts of efforts to find out who the leaker is. That’s 
a different scenario, requiring careful preparations.
Reinterpretation
You need to be prepared for lies, minimising of what happened, 
blaming and framing.
Suppose you were at a meeting when the boss asked someone 
to sign false statements. You might imagine you could report 
this — after all, there were a dozen witnesses. But then you find 
that the boss denies asking anyone to sign statements, and every 
other person there supports the boss. They are all lying! If this 
is a really big issue, you might prepare by covertly recording 
the conversation. (Be careful: if your recording is discovered, 
it may destroy your relationships.) Moral: when others might 
lie, you need strong documentation. Lying can also be a mode 
of cover-up.
The boss might say that signing false statements is not a big 
deal; it goes on all the time. This is the technique of minimis-
ing: saying what happened is not as important as others might 
think. To counter this, you can collect information showing that 
it is important. Maybe there were previous examples in your 
own organisation in which signing false statements was treated 
as a major ethical violation. Another possibility is finding the 
2  On leaking, see Kathryn Flynn, “The practice and politics of leaking,” Social Alter-
natives, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2011, pp. 24–28, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/11sa/Flynn.html
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way this sort of action is treated in other organisations, espe-
cially those with good reputations for probity.
The boss — if caught red-handed doing the wrong thing — 
might try to blame others. One possibility is blaming the work-
ers who signed the false statement, saying they have respon-
sibility. Another possibility is blaming higher management for 
requiring this sort of behaviour. You might think it’s unfair to 
blame workers who have to choose between signing false state-
ments and losing their jobs, or you might think they are all to 
blame. The risk in allowing the blaming game to take hold is 
that responsibility is diffused and eventually only a few scape-
goats suffer any penalty. So be prepared with information and 
understanding of procedures that enable blame to be assigned 
correctly.
Finally there is the viewpoint that this is the way things are 
done: there’s nothing really wrong with it because overall no 
one is hurt, and too much red tape just costs time and bother 
without any benefit. Or maybe the viewpoint is that this is the 
way it’s always been done, and it’s okay. This is a perspective 
on corruption that it’s normal. It’s a way of looking at the is-
sue, often held quite sincerely. You have a different viewpoint 
— a different frame — namely, that signing false statements is 
High Court of Australia
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wrong. You need to be prepared with evidence and arguments 
to counter the view that “our actions are okay.”
The struggle over interpretations is about the meaning of 
events. What really happened? How significant is it? Is this nor-
mal behaviour or corruption? You need to be prepared to con-
front others who will present information and views completely 
different from yours, and who will disguise and distort percep-
tions and interpretations in a self-serving way.
Official channels
Official channels tend to dampen outrage. So how do you pre-
pare for them? If you decide to make a formal complaint or 
mount a court action — despite the disadvantages — then find 
out beforehand about the most promising options. Sometimes 
you have a choice of official channels: an organisational griev-
ance procedure, an ombudsman, an auditor-general, an anti-
corruption commission, a politician or several types of courts, 
for example. Before embarking on what seems the most obvious 
and relevant option, find out about it. Who else has used the 
same method? How long did it take? How much did it cost? 
Were they successful?
Whistleblowers know their own case intimately and often 
believe, quite strongly, that they are right. So they think, “Of 
course the complaint procedure or the court will rule in my fa-
vour.” That’s one reason why whistleblowers keep trying official 
channels despite their manifest weaknesses. The trouble is, of-
ficial channels do not operate on the basis of who’s right: they 
operate on the basis of rules and formal processes, and these 
can sabotage even the most powerful case — powerful on paper, 
that is.
By finding out about previous experiences with official chan-
nels, some realism can be brought into planning. If only 1 out of 
50 previous applicants to a court was successful, then your odds 
are the same: 1 out of 50.3 Turn off the voice that says “My case 
3  For some courts, this is close to the actual figure. In the US, which has the longest 
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is different” because it will send you down a path to destruction.
What if there isn’t any information about previous experi-
ences? Then ask around to find out who else has tried the same 
thing. Even one or two previous stories are far better than none.
If you decide to engage with an official channel, be aware of 
what your opponents will do. They will try to slow down the 
process, keep everything as confidential as possible, make eve-
rything as technical and procedural as they can, and increase 
your costs. You are hoping for a quick, focused, open process. 
Good luck, because all the pressures will be in the other direc-
tion. Be prepared for a long slog. Assess your finances, your 
relationships and your supporters. Can you last for months or 
years? If going to court, are you prepared for appeals, spinning 
the process out for years?
You may decide instead to avoid official channels and instead 
mount a campaign. This requires planning too. This is a whole 
separate topic. It includes writing stories of your experiences, 
mustering supporting evidence, being prepared to speak, find-
ing allies, making information available, liaising with the me-
dia, and much else.4  
Intimidation
When you do something like speaking out about corruption, 
you need to be prepared for reprisals. Don’t be surprised and 
taken off balance. Instead, be prepared. Read about what’s in-
volved in being “resilient” in the face of adversity.5
experience with whistleblower legislation, “Between passage of the 1994 amend-
ments and September 2002, whistleblowers lost 74 of 75 decisions on the merits at the 
Federal Court of Appeals, which has a monopoly on judicial review of administra-
tive decisions.” Tom Devine, “Whistleblowing in the United States: The Gap between 
Vision and Lessons Learned,” in Whistleblowing around the World: Law, Culture and 
Practice, ed. Richard Calland and Guy Dehn (Cape Town: Open Democracy Advice 
Centre; London: Public Concern at Work, 2004), pp. 74–100, at pp. 83–84.
4  Brian Martin, The Whistleblower’s Handbook: How to Be an Effective Resister 
(Charlbury, UK: Jon Carpenter, 1999), http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/99wh.html.
5  Salvatore R Maddi and Deborah M Khoshaba, Resilience at Work: How to Succeed 
no Matter what Life Throws at You (New York: Amacom, 2005); Amanda Ripley, The 
Unthinkable: Who Survives When Disaster Strikes — and Why (New York: Three Rivers 
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You should tell your family and close friends what to expect, 
at least if this information won’t distress them too much. If they 
are prepared, they can support you more effectively.
If some of the reprisals have financial implications, for exam-
ple if you could lose your job or be sued, take action in advance 
to reduce the danger. This might mean paying off debts, cutting 
back on expenses, finding another job, or transferring assets to 
others.
If there are physical dangers, for example of being assault-
ed, you need to protect yourself. How to do this depends a lot 
on the circumstances. It might mean avoiding certain places, 
checking your car before driving, leaving town or even creating 
a new identity.
One of the most powerful ways to deal with intimidation is 
to document and expose it. This is because many people think 
intimidation is wrong and will support you more if they believe 
you are being attacked. So be prepared to use all the usual meth-
ods of collecting information, but this time in advance of pos-
sible reprisals. This might involve collecting emails or signed 
statements, recording conversations or taking photos. It might 
involve having contingency plans in case you’re arrested, so that 
others can take action on your behalf.6
Press, 2009).
6  Zorana Smiljanic, “Plan B: Using Secondary Protests to Undermine Repression,” 
New Tactics in Human Rights, http://www.newtactics.org/en/PlanB
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These precautions might not be necessary and others might 
think you’re being paranoid. Being prepared for attack is still 
quite sensible even if it seems braver to just wait and handle 
whatever comes. Being prepared for the worst can make you 
more confident and able to act: you don’t need to worry as 
much. 
If you’re well prepared, opponents are actually less likely to 
attack, if they realise that their attacks will be exposed and po-
tentially backfire. So it’s often a good idea to let others know 
that you’re prepared.
Police violence
You’re planning a rally and are concerned about the possibility of 
police violence.
This is an example of attack on a public protest. Attacks might 
also come from opponents (counter-protesters), vigilantes or 
paid thugs.
Cover-up
When police use force against protesters, they seldom want wit-
nesses to see what they’re doing. If they appear to be brutal, 
it will look bad to witnesses. Indeed, it is a classic type of un-
fairness: one person hitting another, who doesn’t resist, without 
justification.
So it’s predictable that police and their allies will try to limit 
visibility concerning police brutality — especially to independ-
ent audiences. How can they do this? 
One way is to beat protesters out of sight, when they think no 
one will see or record the violence. Cameras are a way to coun-
ter this. The police know this, so they try to confiscate or dam-
age cameras. To prepare for this, lots of protesters should have 
cameras. Audio recording is another option, to capture what 
police are saying. 
Recording video and audio is the first step. The next is to 
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make this material available to audiences, with credibility. Vid-
eos can be uploaded onto YouTube; they need to be identified 
so that the events make sense. Then people need to be notified 
about the YouTube material. 
Technology for recording and distributing information is 
continually developing. Technological details are important 
and need to be assessed in light of key elements of the challenge 
to cover-up: 
•	 gather information
•	 distribute information to audiences
•	 make it credible
Making information credible can be by involvement of a re-
spected journalist or other observer, by collecting high-quality 
images and putting them together into a compelling narrative, 
and by distributing the information through outlets with status 
or influence.
Sometimes photos are not very revealing. There are ways 
Electroshock baton. Governments and companies selling and using equip-
ment for torture use various methods to reduce public outrage.
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for police to hurt protesters without appearing so bad, for ex-
ample pain compliance holds, rubbing pepper spray into eyes, 
and electroshock batons. To expose these sorts of methods, you 
need to think about what is credible to an audience. Maybe hav-
ing several protesters tell about their experiences would be ef-
fective. A medical expert could testify about the impact of the 
methods used. 
Occasionally, a member of the police is willing to speak out. 
However, doing so would probably mean the end of their ca-
reer. Another option is leaks from within the police, for ex-
ample notes on police plans or recordings of interrogations. If 
protesters can cultivate a police insider, this is a powerful way 
to expose abuse. If the police think a member of the force is 
divulging information, this might lead to more caution on their 
part. It might also lead to a witch-hunt for potential leakers.
Discussing witch-hunts for police leakers seems almost a dif-
ferent topic from the original one: cover-up of police brutality 
and how to counter it. The key point here is not about which 
particular counter-tactics you choose, but the process of think-
ing about it. You begin by thinking of what the police might do 
— beating protesters — and assume they will try to hide their 
brutality from wider audiences. Then you proceed to think of 
how to expose the brutality, and what the police might to do 
stop you exposing it. You need to think creatively. There are no 
answers that always work, because the police will learn from 
your actions and you will learn from theirs.
Devaluation
Police can get away with brutality more easily if people think the 
protesters are lower status. For most people, hurting a criminal, 
terrorist or disreputable-looking protester who behaves weirdly 
is not as bad as hurting a valued member of the community.
Therefore, it is predictable that police and others who sup-
port the police or oppose the protesters will use the technique 
of devaluation. They will apply labels: they will call protesters 
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“rabble,” “low-life,” “rent-a-crowd” or “terrorists.” Unsympa-
thetic photographers will show the protesters in the worst pos-
sible light, for example through pictures of less conventional 
protesters in unflattering poses. They will claim protesters were 
violent. They will dredge up information, for example about 
previous crimes, bad behaviour, misuse of funds, infighting or 
racist statements, and use it to discredit the protesters. Some of 
the information might be misleading or manufactured. The aim 
is to discredit the protesters. 
To be prepared for devaluation tactics, several factors are 
worth considering.
•	 Appearance
•	 Participants
•	 Behaviour
•	 Reputation
•	 Commitments
Many observers judge protesters by the way they appear, even 
though, in a logical sense, this should have little or nothing to do 
with the credibility of the protesters’ cause. Appearance makes 
a difference. Slovenly or unorthodox dress can reduce credibil-
ity. So think carefully about what image you want to send. Is 
it about responsible citizens? You may prefer a casual look, to 
encourage greater participation. An alternative is formal dress, 
to suggest a higher status. Or everyone could wear the same col-
our. Or occupational groups, such as nurses or sporting teams, 
could wear their work uniforms.
Devaluation is harder when participants have high status. So 
it’s worth thinking about who might join. Older people can give 
the authority of experience and seniority. Prominent individu-
als — politicians, artists, media personalities — can add glam-
our. Perhaps some of the protesters have credibility due to their 
roles as journalists, lawyers, doctors or religious leaders. If indi-
viduals with credibility become victims of police brutality, their 
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personal stories will help to validate the protesters, especially 
with audiences that trust them. 
The behaviour of protesters can make a big difference. If pro-
testers have been shouting ugly slogans and shaking their fists, 
this gives an impression of being angry and aggressive, so it’s 
easier to portray them as violent. On the other hand, if pro-
testers are polite, singing tunefully or having fun, this gives an 
impression of being positive and happy, an image that is harder 
to devalue.
Even when just a few protesters behave in a way that can be 
discredited — for example, by swearing, making rude signs, 
throwing rocks or assaulting opponents — this can be used to 
discredit the entire group. Media often focus on the most vi-
olent or outrageous actions, picking a few seconds of conflict 
as newsworthy and ignoring hours of peaceful behaviour. To 
avoid this sort of discrediting image-making, protesters need 
to prepare to resist temptations to behave in ways that can be 
portrayed negatively. Police know that protester violence is bad 
for protesters, and may try to provoke protesters through taunts 
or rough treatment, hoping that some protesters will lose their 
tempers and strike back. When that happens, police violence is 
far easier to justify: it is seen as a response to protester violence.
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Some police forces go further in their efforts to provoke pro-
testers. They may use agents provocateurs, namely police agents 
or stooges who pretend to be protesters and act in ways that 
discredit the protest. Provocateurs sometimes take a lead role in 
promoting violence, throwing bricks or organising purchase of 
materials to make explosives. Provocateurs who are more subtle 
will use their influence to convince or goad others into using 
violence. The protesters who are dupes of the provocateur think 
they have made their own decision to use violence, while the 
provocateur can remain in the background, perhaps fading out 
of the scene.
The use of agents provocateurs shows that police sometimes 
prefer protesters to be more aggressive. The reason is image: 
when protesters use violence, many observers believe that the 
protesters’ goal is aggression and causing harm: the observers 
look at the methods used and assume that the purpose is similar 
to the methods. The protesters might be concerned about envi-
ronmental problems or human rights, but if they use violence, 
their message can be lost due to the image created. The theory 
behind this is called correspondent inference theory: observ-
ers infer purposes by assuming a correspondence with actions 
taken.7 This is a good argument for behaving in ways that are 
compatible with the goals being sought. 
Your reputation can protect you, to some extent, against de-
valuation. If the group organising the protest is known as re-
sponsible, prestigious, predictable and principled, then claims 
that the group is despicable and criminal are not likely to be 
believed. Indeed, if your reputation is good enough, attempts 
at devaluation may be so transparently false that they discredit 
the attackers.
The next question is how to build a reputation. This isn’t easy. 
Even if the protest includes movie stars and Nobel Prize win-
ners, they can be attacked as dupes of organisers. Often, the best 
reputation comes from involvement of people who are person-
7  Max Abrahms, “Why terrorism does not work,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 
2, Fall 2006, pp. 42–78.
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ally known in the community. If participants include next-door 
neighbours, family doctors, school teachers and community 
workers — people who are known personally and respected — 
then it is likely that their version of the protest will be trusted 
over claims by critics. 
Building a reputation is an ongoing challenge. It is definitely 
worth the effort.
Another way to resist devaluation is by making commit-
ments. If the organisers say that everyone must remain non-
violent, or participate in nonviolence workshops beforehand, 
this can increase the credibility of the protest. Commitments 
are useful, but to be credible, they need to be matched by be-
haviour.
Reinterpretation
You say that police were brutal and protesters were badly hurt. 
The police and politicians say that the police never struck any-
one, that protesters were violent, that protesters’ injuries were 
minor, that protester complaints have no substance, that a few 
rogue police were responsible for injuries, that police were just 
doing their duty, and that law and order must be maintained. 
If police assault protesters, you can predict these sorts of lies, 
justifications and rationalisations. The police will lie about what 
happened, minimise its significance, blame others (protesters, 
rogue police, politicians — anyone convenient) and look at the 
events from their point of view. If you can predict these sorts of 
reinterpretation, then you can plan in advance to counter them.
Lying. If police lie about what happens, you need to have good 
evidence to expose the lies. As a process, lying is similar to cov-
er-up. Cover-up is hiding the truth or, in other words, lying by 
omission. It’s a type of deception. Lying is telling a falsehood. It 
happens all the time. Be prepared with exactly the same sorts of 
preparations as for dealing with cover-up, namely ways to show 
people what really happened.
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Police almost always believe that they must stick together. 
For police to inform on misbehaviour by other police is seen 
as the lowest act of all. Police subscribe to the police “code of 
silence”: the rule is never to snitch on other police. That means 
it’s okay to lie on behalf of other police.8
Minimising. Perpetrators of assaults often think what they’ve 
done is not nearly as serious as do the victims.9 This could be a 
conscious deception — a lie — but can also be a sincere inability 
to see things from the point of view of those on the other side, or 
a sincere disagreement with their perspective. When the police 
use force in subduing or arresting someone, they don’t think a 
lot about the pain and damage they cause, whereas those who 
8  Michael W. Quinn, Walking with the Devil: The Police Code of Silence (Minneapo-
lis: Quinn and Associates, 2005).
9  Roy F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (New York: Freeman, 
1997).
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are subdued or arrested are vividly aware of it, sometimes for a 
very long time afterwards. Police, in explaining their actions, 
therefore may minimise the consequences of their actions in 
comparison to the viewpoints of those on the receiving end. 
Minimising language can be countered by being prepared 
to collect evidence about impacts. This includes cameras, wit-
nesses, victim statements, photos and testimony by medical 
personnel. Preparation is similar to what’s useful for dealing 
with cover-up.
Blaming. If police assaults are exposed and the negative public-
ity starts to hurt the police, then they may start blaming. Those 
involved will say someone else was responsible: police might 
blame their commanders or politicians; police chiefs might 
blame a few “rogues” or “bad apples.”
How do you prepare for blaming? This depends a lot on the 
situation and what you want to achieve. It’s easier to collect evi-
dence about the police who use excessive force, by taking pho-
tos, collecting names and exposing individuals. However, when 
police are acting under orders, some responsibility lies with 
commanders or politicians. It’s usually much harder to gather 
evidence about this. If you can get to know members of the po-
lice, you may be able to gain insights or even documents, such 
as emails, that implicate higher officials.
The more you know beforehand about who is responsible for 
police conduct, the more you can prepare for blaming tactics 
in the aftermath of police brutality. Can this make any differ-
ence beforehand? One possibility is to communicate with po-
lice, and maybe with other audiences, about responsibility for 
police conduct. That way, they will know that you know how to 
counter blaming tactics.
Framing. Police will describe what happened using their own 
conceptual framework. This means a set of ideas they use to 
make sense of the world. Police typically believe that they are 
doing a valuable service to the community. They may believe 
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that unruly protest — or any protest at all — is a threat to the 
social order. They may believe that they must enforce the law. 
They may believe that protesters are the enemy, or agents of the 
enemy, and should be punished for their behaviour.
When police beat up protesters, they perceive this differently 
than protesters. Police see this as doing their job, according to 
commands and standard procedure. When challenged, they do 
not think in terms of brutality but in terms of getting their job 
done.
Framing is a way of thinking and often is quite sincere. Fram-
ing is not a devious technique like lying, but rather something 
that everyone does in one way or another.
When preparing for the possibility of police violence, you 
should expect there will be a clash of frames, in other words a 
struggle over the way to interpret what happened. It’s impor-
tant to be aware that the police and their supporters are seeing 
things entirely differently from you. If you can understand their 
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perspective, you may be able to come up with ways to challenge 
or counter it, for example by developing creative ways to frame 
your own perspective that appeal to audiences and either un-
dermine or make irrelevant the police framing. Concepts like 
“free speech,” “democracy” and “human rights” can be useful. A 
slogan or image may be helpful in presenting your own frame.
Protesters often believe their perspective is obvious to oth-
ers. After all, they are protesting in the interests of everyone, 
unlike opponents. The main thing is to realise that your per-
spective, no matter how high-minded, is not obvious to others. 
You need to be prepared for the other side selling their own 
viewpoint, in many cases because they sincerely believe it. It’s 
useful to remind yourself that nothing is obvious to everyone. 
Even a brutal murder does not tell a story on its own: it needs 
to be interpreted.
Official channels
Protesters often have an ambivalent attitude towards official 
channels. If official channels like grievance procedures, courts 
and s worked well, there would be no need to protest. For ex-
ample, to stop a dangerous technology or an environmentally 
damaging development, all that would be required is to present 
a rational case to government bodies that must license the de-
velopment, and the right decision would be made. However, the 
agencies and processes for dealing with developments are often 
corrupted in one way or another, either through inside influ-
ence or a pervasive ideology that serves powerful groups.
Because official channels so often don’t work, people protest 
in order to make their views known. Protest is a non-official 
channel. Protest often is a repudiation of official channels.
Official channels can be pursued by protesters or by police or 
both. The main thing to remember is that official channels usu-
ally reduce public outrage. Sometimes you may think the ben-
efits are worth this sacrifice. Sometimes you have no choice but 
to be involved, for example after being arrested. If your aim is to 
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increase public outrage over the issue you’re protesting about, 
then you should think in terms of mobilisation: getting more 
people concerned and active.
To prepare in relation to official channels, the main thing is 
to think through your responses to various contingencies.
•	 If the police use violence, do you make formal com-
plaints? Do you take the police to court? These sorts of 
options are likely to reduce outrage. Far more power-
ful is to have a plan to publicise information about the 
violence to wider audiences.
•	 If the police use violence and this generates bad public-
ity for the police, then the government or the police 
themselves may set up an inquiry. An inquiry moves the 
issue of police violence from the public sphere — where 
members of the public discuss the issue — into a formal 
sphere based on rules and procedures. You can’t stop an 
inquiry. If one is set up, you can make demands.
•	 The inquiry should be by an independent body — not 
run by the police or government.
•	 The inquiry should be open, with proceedings open to 
the media and members of the public.
If the inquiry is closed and run by the police, it will most likely 
be a whitewash. No one knows what is happening, so there’s no 
publicity. Some people will want to wait to hear the findings. 
Meanwhile, outrage dies down.
An open inquiry gives more possibilities for maintaining at-
tention to the issue, through media reports of hearings. Even so, 
you shouldn’t assume this is enough, because the inquiry might 
support the police or give weak recommendations. You should 
try to use the inquiry to generate support for your cause.
To return to your original situation: you’re planning a protest 
and need to be prepared for police violence. If the police aren’t 
violent, the whole issue of official channels doesn’t arise. If they 
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are violent, then you need to be prepared for the possibilities 
concerning official channels.
Intimidation and rewards
The possibility that police will assault protesters acts as a kind of 
intimidation in itself, and may scare people away from joining 
a protest. Then there is arrest and possibly forms of individual 
harassment during arrest and while in jail. Afterwards, police 
may select certain protesters for special attention, for example 
surveillance, visits and arrests.
The greatest protection against these scenarios is through 
preparing to document and expose abuses. Preparing for intim-
idation is just like preparing for police violence at a protest. For 
example, if, after the protest, police single out some activists for 
surveillance and harassment, this needs to be exposed. These 
Protest in Sanaa, Yemen (February 3, 2011)
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activists need to behave well, because ill-tempered remarks or 
actions can damage credibility and be used as a pretext for po-
lice actions.
Another way to prepare for intimidation is to attract greater 
numbers of people to the protest. People feel safer taking action 
in a group. Police are usually less likely to attack a large crowd 
than a small group. How to attract more participants? The 
standard methods are getting more people to join the move-
ment and designing an action that is attractive. If fear of police 
violence is a major factor, then it’s worth choosing a time, place 
and approach that lowers the risk, for example a prominent lo-
cation where lots of non-participants will be watching.
With lots of participants in a rally, there is a greater risk that 
some will use violence and provide a justification for police 
violence. Therefore, it is worth thinking of other sorts of ac-
tions, for example people wearing green clothes, singing songs, 
or greeting strangers in the street, that seem harmless on the 
surface but can symbolise solidarity.
Rewards can reduce people’s incentive to do anything about 
injustice. Police know that if they remain loyal to their com-
manders — which includes adhering to the code of silence, 
namely not speaking about abuses by fellow officers — they are 
more likely to retain their jobs and obtain promotions. Some 
protesters become police informants; often they receive pay-
ments for their efforts. 
Reprisals
Your group has taken a leading role in opposing a powerful politi-
cian. You’re worried about reprisals.
This is an example of the general issue of coming under at-
tack. This might involve surveillance, infiltration, spreading of 
rumours, harassment of members, confiscation of equipment, 
threatening messages, character assassination in the media, au-
dits of finances, break-ins and host of other methods. They op-
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erate to make your group less effective, by damaging the group’s 
reputation, scaring members, taking up time and effort defend-
ing, and causing dissension among members and supporters. 
How can you prepare in ways that ward off the attack and make 
the attackers wish they had never started?
Cover-up
Some attacks are made openly, as when a politician criticises 
your group in a television broadcast. That’s easier to deal with 
and actually may be beneficial, giving your group more visibil-
ity. 
Other attacks, though, are made in ways that hide the attack-
ers and their methods. To counter such attacks, it is often effec-
tive to document the attacks and expose them.
•	 If you receive threatening messages, then obtain copies 
and tell people what’s happening. If the messages come 
by email, it’s easy to save them. If you receive threaten-
ing or abusive phone calls, invest in technology to make 
recordings of future calls of a similar type. Likewise if 
you receive spoken threats face-to-face: use a recorder. 
When you have solid evidence, you can produce a 
factual account — a written statement, a recording or 
even a video — and circulate it to anyone who would 
be interested, using various media. Publicising threats 
is worthwhile as long as your supporters are not too 
frightened by this information. You need to show that 
you’re not intimidated but, instead, are prepared to 
stand up against the threats.
•	 If there is a potential for an attack through an interme-
diary, you should try to find out who’s behind the ac-
tion. For example, imagine that the police are instructed 
by a politician to undertake a raid against your offices. 
Do you have contacts among the police — or among 
politicians — who can give you the inside story? The 
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more informants who are sympathetic to your cause, 
the harder it is for opponents to remain invisible or to 
disguise responsibility for their actions.
•	 Rumours can be a powerful means of attack, in part 
because no one takes responsibility for initiating them. 
Rumours can be about financial, sexual, ideological or 
other matters. For example, the rumour might be that 
you have links to a terrorist organisation. What can you 
do to expose rumour-mongering? This can be difficult 
and delicate. If you seem to take the rumour seriously, 
for example by giving a logical rebuttal, it may give 
it greater credibility. A different sort of response is to 
make fun of the rumour, for example by using images 
or word play that highlights the absurdity of the allega-
tions.
•	 If you anticipate certain types of attacks, such as beat-
ings or arson, think about how you can expose them. 
This is similar to preparing to expose police violence, 
except there are more possibilities. 
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Attack role-play 
If your group has been attacked previously and you antici-
pate further attacks, then planning is definitely worthwhile. 
One thing to do is prepare for a repeat of a previous attack, 
so that if it occurs again, you can obtain evidence and ex-
pose it. 
To prepare for other sorts of attacks, you could assign 
two or three members to pretend they are attackers and to 
imagine ways to attack your group. Then everyone breaks 
into teams to work out responses to each of these imagined 
attacks.
If attacks are a regular occurrence, it may be worthwhile 
running role-plays of your responses. These would be like 
fire drills: you do everything you would do as in an actual 
attack, and afterwards analyse what happened and use the 
experience to make better preparations.
Devaluation
Your group’s reputation can be attacked in all sorts of ways. A 
politician could make derogatory claims and the media might 
run damaging stories. Claims might be made about terrorist 
connections, corrupt dealings, dangerous practices, sexual mis-
demeanours and all sorts of other things.
You can prepare for several sorts of responses.
1. Ignore the claims, because they are absurd. No one will 
believe them.
2. Make a rational, factual response, with documents and 
testimonials.
3. Counter-attack, for example by pointing out the mali-
cious motivations of opponents.
4. Make fun of the attacks.
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1. Ignore the claims 
You might assume that these sorts of claims are so absurd that 
no one will believe them. You don’t need much preparation for 
this response. But how will you know it’s the right thing to do? 
It might be worth doing a small survey of your supporters and 
of others (neutrals) to fi nd out about your group’s reputation, 
and its strong and weak points. If you learn that there are some 
concerns already, for example about certain positions or actions 
taken by your group, this may indicate areas of vulnerability. 
Th ese might be areas where it’s more important to respond.
2. Make a rational, factual response
You can have facts on hand to counter the attack, and use them 
in a media release, a website, an email list and whatever other 
means you have for responding. To be prepared, your group 
needs to have people who know enough about the issues and 
the group to prepare a response. You need to have people with 
skills in writing and speaking, so you can communicate the re-
Cartoon by Corax used by Otpor
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sponse. It’s helpful to have supporters in key places who can 
speak on your behalf. 
For example, if you know media commentators who are sym-
pathetic, then make sure they know enough about your group 
to be able to reject false claims and provide facts. If there are 
prominent people who support you — well-respected members 
of the community — make sure they are well briefed about what 
you say and do. Find out which ones might be willing to speak 
on your behalf. There might also be some people who don’t sup-
port you but who believe in fair play, and who would be willing 
to challenge criticisms based on lies and misrepresentations. 
Their statements will be especially powerful because they will 
be seen as less self-interested.
If you are well prepared, then an attack might actually benefit 
your group, by mobilising all sorts of people in your defence. 
Just remember that they need to know enough about your 
group to be able to counter false claims.
3. Counter-attack
The idea here is to turn the spotlight on the attackers, showing 
their ulterior motives, lies, conflicts of interest, corrupt behav-
iour and other shortcomings. To prepare for this counter-tactic, 
you might prepare a “dirt file” — a collection of information 
damaging to your opponents — and have ways to publicise 
claims. For example, you might know people who have a griev-
ance against your opponents and who are willing to speak out.
This can be a powerful approach, but you need to think care-
fully about whether it is the best way to proceed. One disadvan-
tage is that you may be seen as the attacker rather than the tar-
get of attack. Instead of being purely a victim of unscrupulous 
politicians, audiences may simply perceive abuse being hurled 
from both sides, and therefore think “anything goes,” namely 
even unsavoury tactics are acceptable. 
If your opponents have more resources and are willing to use 
them, it may be better to avoid counter-attacking. On the other 
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hand, if most members of the public already think your oppo-
nents are corrupt, then you don’t need to worry so much — and 
you don’t need to lead the counter-attack, because others may 
do it for you.
4. Make fun of the attacks
You can use humour to defuse the attacks. This could be through 
jokes, hoax media releases, costumes or protest stunts. 
In 2000, the activist movement Otpor suffered repression 
from the Serbian regime led by Slobodan Milosevic. The regime 
said Otpor were terrorists, fascists and drug addicts. A cartoon-
ist drew a satirical picture of Otpor as a little boy drawing a 
clenched fist, Otpor’s symbol, on the pavement while threat-
ened by large caricatures of Milosevic and other Serbian lead-
ers. Otpor used the cartoon in leaflets that juxtaposed the in-
nocent image with the regime’s labels.10  
By using humour, you send the message that these claims 
about your group are not to be taken seriously: they are just 
silly. This makes it more difficult for the attacker to continue 
with claims, because it may just remind people of the silliness. 
The big challenge is to come up with humorous techniques 
that resonate with supporters and even with opponents. If the 
humour is seen as too nasty, it may seem like a counter-attack. 
Sarcasm might be misinterpreted as being serious. To be pre-
pared to make fun of attacks, you should practise beforehand, 
thinking up light-hearted ways to respond. You might even 
come up with some ideas for actions that you can use whether 
there’s an attack or not.
Reinterpretation
The attackers may lie about what they are doing or the reasons 
for it, say that what’s happening is not that significant, blame 
others for any problems, and present their own perspective on 
10  Majken Jul Sorensen, “Humour as a serious strategy of nonviolent resistance to 
oppression,” Peace & Change, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 2008, pp. 167–190.
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what it all means. To prepare, you need to have people on your 
side who are familiar with the facts, clear about your group’s 
view on the world, and who have the capacity to communicate 
with relevant audiences. You need to be able to back up every-
thing your people say.
For example, if there’s a raid on your offices and your com-
puters are confiscated, the police may say it’s a routine check 
and that nothing was taken. (They might also say the raid was 
about drugs, a claim that better fits into devaluation.) If you 
have video evidence that the police removed computers, you 
can expose the lie. If you have informants saying that a politi-
cian ordered the raid, you can expose another lie. You can say 
that the raid is an outrageous assault on democracy and free 
speech.
Confiscation of your computers is a serious matter, and you 
should be prepared. This involves planning independently of 
backfire analysis.11
Official channels
When your group comes under attack, it’s likely that vari-
ous laws and regulations are violated. You might be tempted 
to make a complaint to the police ombudsman, sue in court 
for defamation, make a complaint to the privacy commission, 
seek a ruling from parliament, or use any of a number of other 
formal processes. Sometimes these options are worthwhile, but 
they are likely to reduce outrage.
When you put in a complaint, you are relying on the sys-
tem to fix the problem — to provide justice. The trouble is that 
the processes are usually very slow, involve a lot of time and 
effort and sometimes money, require the use of experts such as 
lawyers, and involve technicalities. You are diverted from cam-
paigning.
If members of your group want to consider these sorts of 
11  For one approach, see Schweik Action Wollongong, “Safeguarding your group: a 
checklist,” http://www.bmartin.cc/others/SAWchecklist.pdf.
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options, ask them for information about the success rate of 
previous complaints. (Often the information isn’t available.) 
Ask them to contact other groups that have made similar com-
plaints, and to find out how much time, effort and money was 
involved. Ask them about how many people were involved in 
the complaint process.
Official channels sometimes are effective in their own terms, 
but there is an opportunity cost: there are things you didn’t do 
because so much time and effort was tied up in the official chan-
nels. You need to think of what you could do if the same time 
and effort were put into campaigning. Instead of writing a sub-
mission to a government agency, imagine the same effort put 
into writing stories to mobilise support or organise an action.
To prepare for the raid on your office, aim to use the possibil-
ity of attack to gain greater support. Invite members to spend 
time in the office. Set up cameras. Back up information. Let 
more people know how everything operates. Introduce people 
to each other. Yes, preparing for a possible raid could be an op-
portunity to become stronger.
Intimidation
If your group comes under attack, some members may be fright-
ened. They might be the ones attacked, or they might worry that 
they will be next.
To prepare, members need to be reassured. One of the best 
ways is to think through possible scenarios, work out responses 
and plan accordingly. When people know what to do, they are 
less afraid.
Some people are strong in a crisis. They are confident, coura-
geous and inspiring. Some of these crisis leaders are old-timers; 
others are young and new to campaigning. The challenge for 
your group is to identify crisis leaders, prepare them for action 
and yet not disappoint them when nothing happens. (You don’t 
need an internal crisis just to give a taste of action.)
Members often have good reasons to be frightened by an at-
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tack: their families and livelihood may be at risk. So think of 
ways they can be protected.
If intimidation is part of an attack, be sure to document eve-
rything that happens. Threats, assaults and reprisals will be 
seen by many outsiders as unfair. By documenting and expos-
ing these actions, you can increase outrage. If you prepare well, 
carry out your plans well and have a bit of luck, the attackers 
may wish they had never acted.
Conclusion
The three examples — speaking out about corruption, the risk 
of police violence and the possibility of reprisals against your 
group — illustrate how to make plans to prepare for threats. 
You can apply the same sort of approach to all sorts of other 
issues, such as online censorship, sexual harassment, arrest and 
torture. The main thing is to think about what others will do to 
reduce outrage about their actions, and then think about what 
you can do to ensure this won’t be effective.
The methods of cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, of-
ficial channels and intimidation are general. By being involved 
with issues and campaigns, you will learn a lot of specific infor-
mation that is essential to being effective. So don’t rely on a list 
of rules. Think for yourself and be creative. 
Being effective requires learning from experience. You can 
learn from what has happened to you and your group previ-
ously. It’s also worthwhile talking to others and finding out what 
worked for them and what didn’t. Which preparations made a 
difference? Which ones were a waste of time? And be sure to let 
others know the lessons from your own experience.
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An injustice is happening right now. 
•	 An activist has just been arrested. 
•	 Protesters are being beaten by police. 
•	 Illegal surveillance of citizens is being undertaken. 
•	 False claims about activists being terrorists are being 
made by the government.
•	 People are being tortured.
•	 Civilians are being killed by airstrikes. 
What should be done? A lot depends on the context. Activists 
need to know the political circumstances, the history of the is-
sue, the situation of potential allies and likely opponents and 
their own capacity to mobilise action — and much else. There’s 
no right answer to the question of what to do.
The backfire model can provide a few insights. That’s all they 
are: ideas about what you might do. These need to be used in 
conjunction with your understanding of what is happening.
If you’ve prepared carefully for what’s happening, then you 
just need to follow through with plans for gathering evidence, 
mobilising supporters, and so forth. However, some events are 
truly unexpected — you wouldn’t think of preparing for them. 
Perhaps there’s publicity about a police beating or there’s a 
media exposé about government corruption. If these are causes 
you care about, you may want to take action. You can predict 
4. Now and afterwards
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that the perpetrators will use methods to reduce outrage. You 
can take action to counter these methods.
The standard five methods for increasing outrage are to ex-
pose the action, validate the target, interpret the events as an 
injustice, mobilise support and avoid official channels, and re-
sist intimidation. These can be abbreviated to reveal, redeem, 
reframe, redirect and resist.
Reveal: expose the action
Exposing an injustice is an incredibly powerful technique. If 
you can reveal information, especially information that reso-
nates with audiences, this generates popular concern that is the 
basis for bringing about change. Exposure sometimes is enough 
to stop an injustice in its tracks.
It is therefore tempting to release as much information as 
possible, and do it as soon as possible. However, you should 
always pause to think about how to be most effective. There are 
several factors to consider.
Consent
Suppose an activist named Helen has been arrested, without 
any justification — it is intimidation, pure and simple. You are 
prepared for a publicity campaign. But first you need to make 
sure Helen agrees to this campaign. If she told you beforehand, 
that’s the consent you need — go ahead. (This is one aspect of 
preparing beforehand.) If you can talk to her, and she agrees 
— go ahead. But what if she says no? Then you should respect 
her request — except perhaps in exceptional circumstances. For 
example, you might have evidence that she is being forced to say 
no, or that without a campaign she is in grave danger.
A different conundrum is when you can’t get in contact with 
Helen and you don’t know what she wants. You then need to 
use your judgement, preferably after consultation with Helen’s 
family and close friends.
Helen might have good reasons to say no to publicity. She 
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might be afraid about derogatory information about her being 
released by the police, or not want her family to know, or be 
worried about the impact of publicity on her career. You need to 
respect her opinion, even if you believe publicity will be better 
for her. She might just feel that she doesn’t want, on this occa-
sion, to be the centre of a campaign. Not everyone does!
If you can talk with her, you can present arguments about 
the value of publicity. If she knows about outrage management 
strategies, she will be in a better position to make an informed 
judgement.
Quality of information 
You have some preliminary reports about beatings, so you rush 
out a media release or inform thousands of supporters through 
Facebook. But what if the reports aren’t correct? Then you will 
lose credibility, especially as a source of quality information. So 
In 1930 in India, Mohandas Gandhi led a campaign against British rule by chal-
lenging the laws on salt. In one key confrontation, police severely beat nonviolent 
resisters. Despite British attempts to reduce outrage, reports of this action greatly 
weakened support for British rule.
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it might be better to wait until the reports are confirmed. 
If you are basing actions on the information, then you need 
to make sure the information is correct. Imagine calling thou-
sands of supporters out on the streets on the basis of a false 
report.
Sometimes the information is correct, but it’s not vivid. You 
might have reports of torture from reliable correspondents who 
are involved in a liberation struggle. You trust the reports be-
cause you know the correspondents. But if there are no inde-
pendent witnesses, then the story might not be taken up. This 
situation can be changed by photographic evidence. Photos or 
videos of torture can be very powerful. 
Should you wait until you have more vivid evidence? If you 
trust the evidence, then it may be worth publicising it. If you 
obtain more vivid evidence later, it is not a surprise but instead 
provides powerful reinforcement. On the other hand, if the ini-
tial evidence is unclear or confusing, then it may be better to 
wait for better evidence.
In late 2003, there were stories from the Red Cross and oth-
ers about torture of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq by US 
prison guards. These received a little bit of mass media coverage 
but had little impact. Then in early 2004, dramatic photos from 
Abu Ghraib became available, creating one of the biggest hu-
man rights stories of the year. In amidst the commentary was 
the information about the early reports, revealing that the story 
had not received much attention until the photos were released.
Media cycles
You decide to release some dramatic information about human 
rights violations. However, there is hardly any mass media cov-
erage, because that same day there was a massive earthquake. 
All the headlines were about the earthquake and your story was 
buried.
You can’t predict natural disasters but you can predict some 
sorts of media priorities, such as elections. Major events like 
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natural disasters may dominate coverage for days, weeks or 
even months. 
You need to learn about the way mass media treat stories. 
Some days of the week and some times of the day are better 
for media releases. So learn about the operations of the local, 
national and even international media so that you can promote 
your information at the best possible time. Sometimes it may be 
better to wait until the time is right.
Social media operate in different ways and not always in the 
same way as the mass media. Learn about their cycles and pri-
orities so you can get a good response. 
Gradual release?
Sometimes you have lots of good material to reveal. It may 
be best to release it all at once, 
to achieve maximum impact. 
Another option is to release it 
gradually, to keep the story going 
longer. The impact of spreading 
out disclosures is shown by the 
way some newspapers ran sto-
ries, over days or weeks, based on 
WikiLeaks documents.
The basic point here is to think 
about how to be effective in dis-
closing information. Sometimes 
you have little control over this, 
but when you do, think about 
your options. Immediate expo-
sure is highly tempting, but it can 
worthwhile to wait until a more 
opportune time, for better infor-
mation or until people support 
your plans.
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Redeem: validate the target
As the injustice proceeds, be prepared for the other side to try 
to discredit you, your group or whoever you’re supporting. You 
need to be prepared to protect your reputation.
Your behaviour is crucial. If you are accused of being a crazy 
destroyer, it can be effective to behave calmly and dress respect-
ably. Your sensible, polite behaviour confounds the claims and 
make your attackers seem to be the crazy ones.
Your language is crucial. If you are being subject to verbal 
abuse, it is tempting to reply the same way, using inflamma-
tory rhetoric. This may not matter, but it’s worth thinking of 
how your language maintains, indeed creates, your image. You 
may decide to speak logically and carefully, or emotionally and 
passionately, or with empathy and compassion. As long as you 
don’t counter-attack, you have an advantage. Styles of speech 
depend a lot on cultural patterns and expectations, and there’s 
no general rule for all situations. The key thing is that your ver-
bal style can play an important role in countering attempts to 
devalue you.
Evidence of your honesty, performance or commitment can 
be helpful. What your supporters say is crucial. If they have evi-
dence of your sincerity and good works, and openly vouch for 
you, this is powerful support against attempts to discredit. 
Example
Scott Parkin, a nonviolent activist from Texas, visited Australia 
in 2005. Without warning, he was arrested and held pending 
deportation. Australian government officials made statements 
suggesting Parkin was involved in violent protest.
Iain Murray, an Australian nonviolent activist who was plan-
ning to meet Scott for a training session that morning, organ-
ised protests in support of Scott. He was careful to refer to Scott 
as a “friend” and to emphasise Scott’s commitment to nonvio-
lence. At one protest in support of Scott, protesters wore  masks, 
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a humorous tactic that sent a message about Scott’s and their 
own commitment to nonviolence. Iain’s attention to language 
and behaviour helped to counter the Australian government’s 
attempts at devaluation. Because of Iain’s shrewd use of meth-
ods, along with other activists, Scott’s arrest and deportation 
generated far more attention and support for nonviolence than 
would have happened otherwise. The Australian government’s 
actions backfired.1
Reframe: interpret the events as an injustice
You need to explain what’s happened, from your point of view. 
This is crucial, because opponents will lie, minimise, blame and 
frame things their way.
You might think the injustice is obvious. There are pictures 
on television. Everyone saw what happened. Surely the facts 
speak for themselves. Wrong! Facts never speak for themselves. 
They need to be interpreted. What is obvious to you may be 
perceived quite differently by others.
1  Brian Martin and Iain Murray, “The Parkin backfire,” Social Alternatives, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, Third Quarter 2005, pp. 46–49, 70.
Protesters opposing the arrest and deportation of Scott Parkin
82
Your opponents may lie. You need to counter this by giving 
accurate information and exposing the lies.
Your opponents will say the issue isn’t all that important. 
They will minimise the consequences. You need to keep saying 
it is important and that the consequences are serious.
If they are put on the defensive, your opponents may blame 
someone, usually a low-level person. Or they will blame a sin-
gle leader, who becomes the scapegoat for an entire policy and 
widespread culpability. You need to pinpoint who is responsi-
ble.
Most importantly, your opponents will talk about the events 
from their own perspective, using language that encourages 
people to think from their point of view. You need to counter 
this by using your own frames. On any issue, you need to know 
what your goal is and whether the current topical issue is a good 
opportunity for promoting your perspective. 
Redirect: mobilise support and avoid official 
channels
If outrage is great enough, the government or other powerful 
groups may set up an inquiry to investigate. Or they may bring 
out some experts to make pronouncements. Or they may tell 
protesters to make complaints to a police grievance procedure 
or to the ombudsman, or to sue in court. Or they may say to 
wait for an election.
What these sorts of responses have in common is an as-
sumption that officials — in courts, inquiries, expert panels, or 
government agencies — will address the problem and provide 
justice. Most of the officials involved in these agencies are well 
meaning; many are highly committed to social justice. But the 
official channels are nearly always slow, involve all sorts of rules 
and regulations, and depend on the use of experts such as law-
yers. They take the issue out of the public domain and put it into 
a special arena that is often ideally suited for sapping energy out 
of protest movements.
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When an issue is hot, you should be aiming to promote ac-
tion and to change behaviours and policies. So it’s usually best 
not to advocate official channels. It might feel good to say “we 
want an inquiry into police violence” or “we want the UN to 
intervene” but the reality is seldom as satisfying.
Sometimes, though, the government, police or other agen-
cies themselves set up official channels. Let’s say it’s a formal 
inquiry. What’s the most effective way to respond?
Option 1: Participate in the inquiry by making submissions, tes-
tifying and encouraging others to do the same. This might help 
to produce better findings. The disadvantage is that energy is di-
verted from public campaigning. If the inquiry produces weak 
recommendations, having participated in the inquiry gives it 
greater credibility.
Option 2: Push for a better inquiry. Internal inquiries — run by 
agencies like the police or by the government — are most likely 
to serve the status quo. So demand an independent inquiry. 
Closed inquiries — in which the hearings are confidential, not 
open to the public — are the most likely to be whitewashes. So 
demand an open, public inquiry. 
Option 3: Infiltrate the inquiry. Have supporters on the inside, 
such as panel members or support staff, who provide informa-
tion about how the inquiry is proceeding and how best to deal 
with it.
Option 4: Ignore the inquiry. Continue campaigning as usual 
and don’t be distracted.
Option 5: Try to discredit the inquiry. Point out weaknesses of 
the inquiry such as narrow terms of reference, misleading as-
sumptions, conflicts of interest and inadequate powers to call 
witnesses and collect information. 
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Option 6: Carry out your own inquiry. A “people’s inquiry” into 
police violence could have public hearings, collect evidence and 
make public statements.
Option 7: Use the inquiry as a campaigning opportunity. When-
ever there is a significant development, hold a rally or carry out 
a stunt. Have members attend the inquiry to collect informa-
tion or carry out an action. Arrange for a running commentary 
on developments, providing an alternative interpretation. With 
this option, your aim is to mobilise support. The inquiry is one 
means to help do this. 
What’s the best option? It depends on the situation. The most 
important thing is to discuss various options and consider 
available evidence about what will work best. What happened 
with previous inquiries? What do you know about the panel 
members? What do members of the public think? 
Later, there’s another time for making decisions: when the 
inquiry finally reports its findings. 
•	 If the findings are not what you wanted, you need to 
challenge the findings — and perhaps question the fair-
ness of the inquiry too.
•	 If the findings are just what you wanted, you may be 
faced with a greater challenge: getting the findings 
implemented. Many people will think, “The problem is 
solved because of these good recommendations” and 
won’t feel the need to do anything. Be prepared to keep 
campaigning.
In a few rare cases, when everyone expects justice through an 
inquiry, weak findings will rekindle outrage. 
After the beating of Rodney King in 1991, there was a court 
case against four police officers involved in the beating. Every-
one expected them to be convicted. But the jury found them not 
guilty. The outrage over justice denied was so great that a riot 
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erupted in South Central Los Angeles, lasting days, with over 
50 people killed and hundreds of millions of dollars of prop-
erty damage. Later, after a second trial of the officers, two were 
found guilty and there were no disturbances.
Resist intimidation
In the midst of an injustice, some people will be afraid to pro-
test because of the risks, whether of looking foolish, losing their 
job, or being arrested, beaten, tortured or killed. Intimidation 
is a powerful tactic against protest and needs to be carefully as-
sessed.
Several points are worth remembering.
•	 Consent. Anyone who resists needs to be fully aware of 
the risks. 
•	 Participation. Usually it is safer to protest when more 
people are involved. (Greater participation, especially 
when a cross-section of the population is involved, also 
gives greater credibility to the protest — at least if eve-
ryone behaves in a way that is difficult to discredit.)
•	 Risk-takers. Some individuals are willing to take greater 
risks. In many cases, young people take the lead. It is 
especially important they understand the risks. They 
need to be supported. On the other hand, impetuous 
action can sometimes be counterproductive. Risk-takers 
are valuable to a protest movement. Their contribution 
should be used for maximum advantage, when really 
needed, and not for trivial purposes. 
•	 Options. It is worth having different ways to protest. 
Some will be riskier than others. If the dangers are 
great, it can be good to have relatively safe ways to pro-
test, such as turning lights on or off, banging pots and 
pans, or wearing clothes of a certain colour or style.
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•	 Visibility. For some individuals, it is safer to resist 
openly than to keep a low profile. If you are a known 
dissident and at risk of arrest, then the more people who 
are around you, the safer you may be, because there will 
be witnesses if anything happens.
Intimidation can be a source of outrage. So you should try to 
obtain good quality, vivid evidence of intimidation and expose 
it to receptive audiences. If you are able to do this, you can make 
attacks counterproductive.
Afterwards
After the events are all over, is there anything you need to do?
The events may be over, but the struggle against injustice isn’t 
over. The memory and meaning and impact of the events can 
still be disputed.
The beating of Rodney King occurred in 1991. In the follow-
ing years, King was occasionally in the news, often for being 
arrested. In 2003, David Horowitz, a prominent commentator 
with right-wing views, wrote an article in which he referred to 
King as “a self-destructive lout,” “a pathetic bum” and “a reckless 
criminal.” Why? Because King’s beating remained a symbol of 
police brutality. Horowitz, by denigrating King, was defending 
the police against critics. The beating of King was over, but its 
significance was still being contested. 
A police beating can be remembered or forgotten. It can be 
seen as less of a concern if the victim — like King — is seen as 
a lesser person. It can be interpreted as correct procedure or 
abuse. It can be seen as having been dealt with appropriately or 
inappropriately by courts or other agencies. People can feel free 
to speak their views about it, or be afraid.
In 1915, during World War I, Armenians, a minority ethic 
group in the Ottoman Empire, were marched from their homes 
by Ottoman troops. A million or more died through starva-
tion, exhaustion and massacres. This is widely seen as one of 
the most significant genocides of the century — but not by the 
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Turkish government (the Ottoman Empire’s successor state), 
which continues to claim no genocide occurred. A century af-
ter the events, the government continues to hide information 
about the events and to intimidate those who interpret them as 
genocide. In other words, the Turkish government continues to 
use methods to reduce outrage over injustice.
In this sense, the Armenian genocide is not over. Its meaning, 
and indeed even its very occurrence, continue to be contested.
Like the beating of Rodney King and the Armenian genocide, 
struggles over the meaning of events can continue for years or 
decades. This is especially true of some events, such as the life 
of Jesus, European colonisation and the Holocaust, that become 
embedded in wider narratives about the meaning of the world. 
Therefore, it is unwise to assume that because the immedi-
ate events are over, the struggle is over and it’s okay to move 
on to other things. There is an important role for maintaining 
memories, validating victims, challenging reinterpretations and 
questioning unfair verdicts. Anniversaries of events — injus-
tices or successful campaigns — can be occasions to rekindle 
concern and maintain vigilance against problems in the future. 
The annual rallies on 6 August, the anniversary of the dropping 
of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, help maintain con-
cern about the dangers of nuclear weapons.
Backfire analysis is one way to keep alive the memory of in-
justice. By exposing the techniques used to manage outrage, the 
memory of injustice is protected from those who prefer to hide 
the story, denigrate the victims and interpret the events as ac-
ceptable.   
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Here are some questions relating to the backfire model, and 
possible answers.
The beatings were terrible. It was a gross injustice. But where was 
the outrage? No one cared. The model doesn’t work. 
The backfire model is about tactics used by perpetrators of 
injustice and ways to counter them. It doesn’t say that people 
are necessarily outraged by what you think is an injustice.
How do you know no one cared or no one was outraged? 
Maybe there were complaints or protests but you didn’t hear 
about them. 
Have you examined the tactics used by the perpetrators to 
reduce outrage? Maybe that’s the reason people didn’t know 
about the beatings or didn’t think they were so important.
Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there were massive protests. But 
the invasion went ahead anyway. The peace movement failed to 
stop it. 
Actually, the protests made a huge difference. They showed 
there was massive opposition and helped discredit the invasion. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, worldwide support for the 
US government was sky-high. The invasion of Iraq squandered 
this good will. The protests were an important part of changing 
public opinion.
Originally, Bush, Cheney and others pushing for the invasion 
had visions of further interventions to impose their will on oth-
er countries such as Syria and Iran. The vocal opposition to the 
invasion of Iraq was one factor in helping scuttle this agenda.
5. Questions and responses
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  In preparation for the invasion, the US government used all 
five methods to reduce outrage. It hid evidence about Saddam 
Hussein’s military capacity, it demonised Saddam as another 
Hitler and implied he was responsible for 9/11, it gave false or 
dubious justifications for going to war (Saddam’s alleged weap-
ons of mass destruction and al Qaeda connections), it sought 
endorsement from the UN (not obtained), and threatened 
and bribed governments on the UN Security Council to sup-
port an invasion. Without protest, these methods would have 
been more successful. For example, if there had been no pro-
test, governments sitting on the Security Council might have 
succumbed to US government pressure, leading the Security 
Council to endorse an invasion, giving it much greater legiti-
macy and opening the door to future invasions.1
How about this idea? We’ll plan an action that leads to activists 
being beaten or even killed. That will generate outrage and pub-
licise our cause.
Planning to create a backfire is possible, but it can be risky. 
1  Brian Martin, “Iraq attack backfire,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 
16, 17–23 April 2004, pp. 1577–1583.
Picture of anti-Iraq-sanctions and anti-Iraq-invasion marchers. 2002 or 2003, 
Washington, DC.
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Any evidence or even speculation that you are doing this can be 
used to discredit you. Therefore, encouraging others to attack 
you, in the hope of a backfire, is seldom advisable.
Instead, you can design what is called a dilemma action, in 
which you take action and whatever the opponent does is bad 
for them. The 2010 Freedom Flotilla to Gaza is an example. If 
the Israeli government allowed the flotilla to land in Gaza, this 
would break the blockade and signal the weakness of the Israeli 
government. But if the Israeli government stopped the flotilla, 
this might be seen as unjust. As it turned out, Israeli comman-
does attacked, with nine passengers killed and others beaten 
and arrested, causing a massive backfire against the Israeli gov-
ernment. However, the flotilla planners didn’t hope for an Israeli 
attack, nor would it be ethical to plan for deaths and serious 
injuries. The flotilla planner made preparations for these out-
comes but there was another option for the Israeli government. 
A dilemma action gives the opponent a choice. 
Dilemma actions need to be carefully prepared, otherwise at-
tacks will not backfire. There was massive publicity about the 
flotilla. But suppose some activists go to a border expecting to 
be killed. If no one knows about it, or knows why they are go-
ing to the border, then killings won’t backfire. Preparation is 
absolutely crucial.
Imagine some activists who are opposed to land mines and 
who decide to walk through a mined area. Some are maimed 
or killed. Would this backfire on the manufacturers and users 
of land mines? Hardly. The activists would probably be seen as 
misguided or stupid, because the opponents — supporters of 
land mines — cannot sensibly do anything.
The backfire model gives too much attention to tactics. We need to 
have a good long-term strategy.
True — the backfire model deals with actions taken in the 
short term. True — strategy is important. So let’s look at the 
connection.
Strategy can be thought of as a plan for achieving a goal, tak-
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ing into account circumstances, resources, allies and so forth. 
Tactics can be thought of as actions taken within the context of 
a strategy. So the key question is not whether there’s too much 
focus on tactics, but rather whether the tactics used are compat-
ible with the strategy.
The backfire model contains some implicit assumptions 
about strategy, most importantly that it is valuable to mobilise 
support via people’s passions against injustice. If your strategy is 
compatible with this assumption, then there’s no problem.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, some activists on your 
side are so frustrated with the lack of progress that they decide 
to use aggression against opponents, treating them badly or 
blowing them up. If this is your approach, don’t use the backfire 
model, because the model suggests an entirely different direc-
tion.
Maybe your strategy is to do whatever you want to that makes 
you feel good. So if you want to dress like gorillas, shout abuse 
at strangers and make a mess in restaurants, go ahead — and 
don’t use the backfire model, because it’s about mobilising sup-
port, not about feeling good. (However, you should be able to 
work out ways to feel good while using the model.)
Strategy is vitally important. But for most activists, strategy 
isn’t all that exciting. Doing things is. So if you care about strat-
egy, you should think about what approaches to tactics — to 
action — are most compatible with an effective strategy. If the 
backfire approach is suitable, help others understand it. If not, 
then do something else.
Sometimes we do things that reduce outrage. We hide things and 
shout abuse. Does that mean we’re perpetrators?
It’s important to separate two things: (1) things that are seen 
as unjust, like beatings and massacres; (2) methods used to re-
duce outrage over things seen as unjust.
If you’re beating up people or shooting them, then you’re def-
initely a perpetrator. Others are likely to see you as the problem.
Imagine you join a protest action and police beat you very 
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badly. You decide, for personal reasons, not to tell anyone. Per-
haps you don’t want your family or your employer to know you 
were protesting. So you’ve contributed to cover-up. That doesn’t 
mean you’re the perpetrator. It just means you haven’t exposed 
the beating, and outrage is likely to be less than it would be oth-
erwise. It’s your choice.
 Imagine that you join a protest and shout nasty slogans about 
the police. Are you a perpetrator? Yes, but only of shouting nas-
ty slogans. This isn’t nearly as serious as a brutal beating. The 
main issue is whether it’s a good tactic to shout nasty slogans. 
It might make some observers think the beating was justified. 
When someone challenges you and says, accusingly, “You’re 
covering up” or “You’re using official channels,” you can answer, 
“What’s the problem?” You’re using methods that reduce out-
rage, but you might have good reasons. 
When someone says, “You’re using intimidation,” you need 
to consider their claim carefully. If what you’re doing is threat-
ening to others, maybe you’re doing the wrong thing. On the 
other hand, maybe they are powerful perpetrators and you’re 
using nonviolent action to challenge their actions. They might 
disagree with your viewpoint or think that civil disobedience is 
Israeli forces violently dispersed a Hebrondemonstra-
tion, firing tear gas and sound bombs and arresting 
one German solidarity activist
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a dangerous threat to the social order, and feel threatened.
Methods that reduce outrage are not automatically bad. Each 
case needs to be considered on its merits. So when labels are 
used (“cover-up,” “intimidation”), be sure to look at what’s re-
ally going on.
I’m in a group about to embark on a campaign that I think is 
misguided, based on my experience. My ideas agree with backfire 
model. How can I use the model to encourage members to support 
an approach more likely to achieve our group’s aims?
You can try to initiate a discussion of options for the group. 
You might say, “The backfire model suggests that it would be 
better to avoid official channels. Maybe we should think about 
this more before proceeding.” Discussion is often valuable.
You need to be open to different ideas. You need to listen as 
well as present your view. Maybe the backfire model is wrong in 
this case, or other considerations are more important.
However, if you’ve listened and discussed and argued on and 
on, but the others are intent on continuing, here are some pos-
sibilities.
•	 Ask them for evidence — from other campaigns — that 
their plan will work.
•	 Make a prediction about what will happen. Write it 
down. If your prediction comes true, you can say, “I told 
you!” (This may not make you popular, however.)
•	 Suggest doing a small experiment trying different meth-
ods, before starting on the major campaign.
•	 Ask them what evidence would change their minds. If 
they can’t think of any, you know that motivations or 
deep beliefs are more important than evidence.
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After all this, you may find they are simply not listening. Maybe 
they think you are a pain in the neck for continuing to question 
the campaign they are committed to. Then what?
Option 1. Join in the campaign. Do what you can to help make 
it successful. Sometimes it’s more important to work together as 
a group, and fail, than to be effective in the short term but then 
for the group to break up due to internal disagreements and 
disputes. In the long term, working together may be the best 
option. Maybe everyone will learn from failures. (Maybe not!)
Option 2. Sabotage their efforts, because they are seriously mis-
guided. This is a very bad option. To even think about it sug-
gests you’ve lost perspective and need to move on —
Option 3. Leave the group and join another, or set up your own 
group. Or just work alone. No more disagreements!
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You can work on these exercises individually or in a group. In 
a workshop, several people or groups can work simultaneously 
on an exercise, comparing responses.
1. Analyse an injustice
Select an injustice that you, or someone in your group, know a 
lot about. It could be from personal experience, like bullying at 
school, from study, such as the Holocaust, or from campaigning 
on an issue, such as child soldiers.
(a) Write down methods used by the perpetrators that 
reduce outrage, under the five categories of 
•	 cover-up
•	 devaluation
•	 reinterpretation
•	 official channels
•	 intimidation. 
(b) Write down methods actually used by the targets to 
increase outrage, under the five categories of 
•	 reveal (expose the action)
•	 redeem (validate the target)
•	 reframe (interpret the events as an injustice)
•	 redirect (mobilise support and avoid official 
channels)
•	 resist (resist intimidation) 
6. Exercises
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(c) Write down the source of your information/knowledge 
about each of these methods, for example observation, 
conversations, news broadcasts, lectures or history 
books.
(d) Write down how you could find out more about the 
methods used.
(e) Write down methods that could be used by targets to 
increase outrage (even if they weren’t used at the time).
(f) Think about or discuss whether classifying the methods 
helps in understanding what happened concerning the 
injustice.
2. Study a backfire article
Pick an article that uses backfire analysis.1
(a) Write a short summary of the key ideas in the article. 
This might be a list of methods of reducing and increas-
ing outrage. 
(b) Assess the analysis. How is evidence used? Are methods 
classified sensibly? Is the conclusion well supported? 
What would you change to make the article more rigor-
ous, informative or persuasive?
(c) Examine the article’s style. Is it academic or popular? Is 
it clearly expressed? Does it use a narrative (story) or 
some other way of presenting information? What would 
you change to make the article more suitable for a spe-
cific audience, for example school children or military 
veterans?
(d) Read another article on the same issue, one that doesn’t 
1  For many possibilities, see “Backfire materials,” http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/back-
fire.html
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use backfire analysis, for example from a news report. Is 
there any new information that could be incorporated 
into the backfire-analysis article? Is there any informa-
tion that challenges the backfire analysis? Does the 
new article reveal any methods that don’t easily fit the 
backfire model?
3. Make a comment
Choose an opportunity to comment on an article or news story 
dealing with injustice, for example a blog or online article. Post 
a comment using ideas from the backfire model. For example, 
you might comment on how an action backfired, how devalu-
ation is being used, or what framing has been adopted. (You 
don’t need to mention the backfire model at all. Just point to 
tactics or consequences.) Look at subsequent comments to see 
whether anyone responds to what you’ve said. Seek to make 
comments that stimulate thoughtful responses and a more in-
formed discussion.
4. Write a backfire analysis
The following steps are suggestions. Modify them to suit your 
needs.
(a) Choose a topic you already know something about, or 
read one or two basic articles. 
(b) Choose a format, for example article, slide show or 
poster.
(c) Write a first draft drawing entirely on your knowledge, 
without consulting any sources.
(d) Read or check several additional sources, modifying 
your draft as you proceed, revising and editing along 
the way.
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(e) When the draft is reasonably coherent and polished, 
give or present it to one or two non-experts, seeking 
their questions and comments. Make revisions.
(f) Give or present the draft to some people knowledgeable 
about the topic. Make revisions based on their com-
ments.
(g) If both non-experts and experts think what you’ve done 
is satisfactory, you can use or present your analysis. If 
not, cycle through steps d to f again.
Tip: start small, so you can finish in a reasonable time. When 
you gain more experience, you can tackle a larger project.
5. Plan for an attack
(a) Imagine a possible attack, for example something dam-
aging done to you personally, to your group, or to some 
person or group you care about.
(b) Write down the things the attacker could do to reduce 
outrage about the attack.
(c) Write down how you, your group or someone else could 
increase outrage.
(d) Write down the most important ways to prepare for the 
attack.
(e) Decide when, where and how these preparations are 
going to happen. 
(f) If the preparation is something you can do personally, 
then do it! If others need to take action, work out a plan 
to encourage them to do it.
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6. Play a game of tactics
It helps to have two or more people for this exercise.
(a) Break into two teams, an attack team and a defence 
team. Decide on a general type of attack.
(b) The attack team — naturally! — thinks up a creative 
ways to attack, including ways to reduce outrage. The 
defence team imagines ways to prepare that would 
counter the attack and increase outrage.
(c) The teams compare their ideas. 
Depending on the scenario, the defence team could wait to hear 
the attack team’s plans, or both teams could prepare simultane-
ously.
7. Make predictions
Watch the media, and pick out a prominent breaking story that 
involves potential wrongdoing by a powerful group. Examples 
from 2011 included assaults on Egyptian protesters, the hacking 
scandal involving News Corporation and the charges against 
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange.
(a) As the story breaks, make predictions about the sorts 
of methods used by the powerful group that reduce 
outrage.
(b) Seek more information, from various sources, or wait 
for further revelations, and see whether your predic-
tions are correct.
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8. Have a conversation
Sometimes you meet someone who is heavily involved in op-
posing an injustice. They might work in a rape crisis centre, 
campaign on environmental issues or be an active member of 
Amnesty International. If you have a chance to talk with them 
for a while, ask them about their issue, using backfire catego-
ries. Here are some possible questions, with “they” referring to 
opponents, such as rapists, polluting companies or repressive 
governments.
•	 Do they cover up information about their activities?
•	 Do they try to devalue the targets?
•	 Do they lie about what they’ve done? Do they minimise 
its significance? Do they blame others? Do they see 
things from a completely different viewpoint?
•	 How well do formal processes like government agencies 
and courts work to fix the problem?
•	 Do they use threats and attacks to intimidate people?
9. Make up your own exercise!
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When humans use their physical presence to protect possible 
targets, such as buildings, they are called “human shields.” The 
idea is that if “innocent” or “well respected” citizens stay close 
to a possible target, the opponent will be hesitant to attack be-
cause of the possibility of a backfire effect. 
Human targets
Civilians who protect other civilians are often referred to as 
“unarmed bodyguards”. Organisations like Nonviolent Peace-
force and Peace Brigades International sponsor and support 
volunteers to serve as human shields for activists who are un-
der threat by the state, guerrilla groups, mafias or paramilitar-
ies. Such organisations have a great record of effective work.1 
On the few occasions when unarmed bodyguards are attacked, 
their group’s well documented and respected history makes it 
difficult to devalue or intimidate them. 
One of the main activities of these groups is to document 
what they are doing so it is difficult for attackers to cover up any 
harm done. Such organisations have a well-developed system to 
distribute information about their activities. Since well-respect-
ed people are either directly involved or function as ambassa-
dors for the work, it is also difficult to reinterpret what has been 
done by lying, blaming and framing. 
1  Liam Mahony and Luis Enrique Eguren, Unarmed Bodyguards: International 
Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian 
Press, 1997).
Appendix: Human shields 
and pre-emptive backfire
Jørgen Johansen
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Buildings and infrastructure
In war situations, humans are sometimes used as shields to pro-
tect buildings and infrastructure. 
When NATO started to bomb Serbia on 24 March 1999, 
hundreds of local and international activists soon came to stand 
on the bridges in Belgrade, Grdelica, Novi Sad and other cities 
in an attempt to prevent them from being destroyed by bombs. 
Some of the foreigners came from countries whose militaries 
took part in the bombing. Since several international media 
were present, NATO commanders avoided targeting bridges 
with people on them. Many other parts of the infrastructure 
were destroyed, but these bridges were saved.
In January 2003, prior to the impending invasion of Iraq, 30 
human shield volunteers left London for Iraq to stay in Bagh-
dad in anticipation of the bombing. During their bus journey 
The Human Shield Action to Iraq crossed the border into northern Iraq from 
Syria on the 15th of February, 2003. This is a picture of the crowd that greeted 
the double-decker buses as they made their way over the border crossing into 
the adjacent street. It was quite a crowd considering no one knew, not even the 
shields themselves until the night before, that this was where they would enter 
Iraq. The man leaning out the door is 68 year old Godfrey Meynell of Britain, 
who was fluent in Arabic and explained to the forming crowd why they were 
there.
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through Europe they picked up many more activists and had a 
peak of approximately 500 who wanted to protect bombing tar-
gets in Iraq. They decided to stay at two water plants, two power 
plants, a food silo, a communication facility and an oil refin-
ery.2 Their goal was to prevent attacks by making it well known 
that they would be living at, in or close to these installations. Of 
these sites, only one was bombed in 2003: the communications 
facility, a day after the human shields left. 
Nature
Some struggles against deforestation have used the technique of 
human shields to protect trees. In India, women from the Chip-
ko movement in Garhwal Himalayas started in the early 1970s 
to “hug trees” when loggers came to cut them down. The earli-
est example of this kind of action can be traced back to 1731 
when Amrita Devi led hundreds of people to protect threatened 
trees in their community. 
Modern environmental activists have developed this further. 
Some of them live up in trees for weeks in order to make it diffi-
cult for forest companies to cut them down. Others have buried 
their bodies, except their heads, in deep holes in the forest road 
to discourage timber transports from taking the timber out. For 
the large trucks to pass, they must drive over and kill the activ-
ists. Some of these campaigns have been successful; others are 
still going on.
Conclusion
These three types of human shields use the backfire effect in a 
pre-emptive way. They deliberately put themselves at great risk 
and hope that adverse publicity from harming or killing them 
will be too high for the people in power. Though this sort of 
technique is not guaranteed to work, careful preparation can 
improve the likelihood of success. Campaigners plan their ac-
2  http://www.humanshields.org
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tions so those in power will face great difficulties when they try 
to prevent popular outrage.
1. Through well-prepared documentation and effective 
dissemination, campaigners make it difficult for the op-
ponent to cover up atrocities.
2. They try to engage well-respected people to reduce de-
valuation of the group carrying out the actions.
3. With good access to mainstream media and as well as 
alternative media channels, they limit the options for 
their opponents to lie, blame, and reframe the actions.
4. Whenever possible, they build relations with official 
bodies like embassies, international organisations and 
governments.
Some devaluation campaigns against such actions focus on 
the lack of volunteer participation. For example, the attackers 
sometimes proclaim that the human shields have been ordered 
to take part. Often the devaluation has taken the form of ru-
mours that the participants will be punished if they refuse and 
rewarded if they take part. Others are called naive or accused 
of collaborating with the “enemy.” The more transparency and 
the more well-respected people who take part, the less effect 
such accusations have. More experimentation and research are 
needed to improve the use of human shields.
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